Victory Lap, or: "The Arab Television Landscape and the Role of the United States: Do We Really Have a Stake?"
Abstract: The landscape of Arab satellite television broadcasting is a breathtaking array of programming that disproves Western conceptions of Arab television as being anti-Western propaganda. In this paper, I will be discussing just how affluent the television industry is in this misunderstood area of the world, and asking questions as to how the progression within the industry can be seen as a Western influence. I will also be discussing how the United States’ involvement in Arab television should be carried out from this point forward, after my analyses of Arab television programming and structure.
Table of Contents
1. Structure of the Arab Television Industry
a. Ownership and Government/State Control
i. Non-governmental Arab Satellite Television Networks
b. Commercialism and Advertising
c. Foreign Involvement and Arab Television
2. Current Programmatic Trends in Arab Television
a. Overview
b. What is Available?
c. The Point of Regionalization and Programming Trends
d. The Question of Globalization
3. Current U.S. Involvement in Arab Television
a. What is Our Role?
b. The Lesson of Al-Hurra
c. What Should We Do?
I. Structure of the Arab Television Industry
a. Ownership and Government/State Control
Historically, the current landscape of Arab television is the result of rapid sociopolitical change in the region, particularly over the past ten to fifteen years. There is definitely validity in saying that the programming landscape of Arab television – and Arab media in general – would not be as rich or as multifaceted as it is in the contemporary period were it not for media globalization, and the lingering impact of colonialism at the core of the matter. As discussed on 02 November 2008, it wasn’t until the early- to mid-1990s that “all Middle Eastern and North African governments owned their media as absolute monopolies,” utilizing the media for purely political means; such reasons included the preservation of control over national unity, the utilization of media as propagandist tool, and the preservation of media from being used as a soapbox by alternative political groups (“Television”).
Prior to the turning-point in 1990, Arab media could be classified in one of two ways: either that of a “strict control system” – where the government wielded control over every decision – or that or a “loyalist system” – whereby media wasn’t necessarily owned by the ruling governments, but catered the beliefs of the state’s ruling party (“Television in the Middle East”). The only pioneers in terms of the concept of “free media” were Israel and Lebanon, which continue to be proponents of relatively “free” media enterprise today.
As with anything, however, money and politics control the mainstream: Saudi Arabia has been no stranger to this, with its royal family having used its affluence and prestige to influence the nation’s media industries over the past seventeen years. The nature of the Arab world’s television landscape is also very similar to that of Western media: Saudi Arabia’s regional takeover, for example, is a reflection of the swiftness of media conglomerates, whereby a very small number of multinational institutions increasingly dominate the nation’s media in nearly every – or even in all – realm(s) (Cochrane 1, 5). Governmental control over media means regional clout for the governing family, thus ridding the soapbox – which television especially provides – that dissenters could potentially access with ease.
As of the 1990s, the nature of Arab television and the overall media industry was met with technological advances, the most relevant being the satellite, which had become cheaper, more accessible, and more widespread amongst Arab nations as a result of Western influence during the Gulf War. By 1996, two pan-Arab satellite channels – LBC (Lebanese Broadcasting Channel) and al-Jazeera (broadcasting out of Qatar) – broke the mold of what Arab satellite television had been until that time, with al-Jazeera providing uncensored news, and LBC offering unabashedly informal entertainment to audiences (“Television”).
Since the increase in availability and decrease in price of satellite technology in the region, the number of free-to-air satellite channels in the Middle East currently exceeds 350, which is a stunning statistic, seeing as though there is a lot more programming diversity in the Arab television landscape than can be found in the United States (“Television”). Examples of non-governmental Arab satellite television networks can be found below: it is truly astonishing to see just how swiftly the increase in television networks have been over the years, and experts do predict that the number will only continue to grow as we progress into a more globalized world.
i. Non-governmental Arab Satellite Television Networks
The following data is from Table 10.1 of William Rugh’s Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics. Divided between free-to-air networks and subscription-based networks, the data is broken down into network name, its national origin, and the year of its establishment. Take note of how the number of free-to-air networks grew exponentially after the year 2000.
• Free-to-Air:
o MBC – Saudi – 1991
o Future – Lebanese – 1995
o LBCI – Lebanese – 1996
o Al-Jazeera – Qatari – 1996
o ANN – Syrian – 1997
o Al-Manar – Lebanese – 2000
o Al-Mustaqilla – Tunisian – 2000
o NBN – Lebanese – 2000
o Dream TV – Egyptian – 2001
o Zayn TV – Lebanese – 2001
o Al-Mihwar – Egyptian – 2002
o Al-Khalifa – Algerian – 2002
o Al-Arabiya – Saudi - 2003
• Subscription:
o ART – Saudi – 1994
o Orbit – Saudi – 1994
(source: Rugh 219)
b. Commercialism and Advertising
Launching a satellite channel is still a commercial venture – it requires a great amount of capital, and thus traces of influence run through the veins of those stations being ran by political elites. Essentially, as with most business ventures, the founder of a new satellite channel must make a choice: either “free-to-air commercial broadcasting, which would carry advertising and derive revenue from that source, or fee-based subscription broadcasting using encoded signals and decoders rented by audience members” (Rugh 218). The commercial model, which is freely used in the United States (with some exceptions) and has been gaining momentum in Western Europe, is – of course – an advertising-based model.
Advertising is a risky venture in the Arab world for many reasons, when compared to the Western model:
• the region – taken as a whole – is not wealthy, and is thus not conducive to being sold products
• audience research is difficult to do, so advertisers do not know much about their audience, which makes niche marketing impossible
• politics steer ads to regime-loyal outlets
(source: Rugh 219)
However, the most lucrative market in the region is – unsurprisingly – Saudi Arabia, with over $270 million having been spent on advertising in 1995 (219).
c. Foreign Involvement and Arab Television
As William A. Rugh notes, the advent of Arab satellite television was important because it brought to the Arab world a new style in news coverage and in political discussion programs. Politics, thus, came out of the private sphere of face-to-face conversation and into the public sphere, made into a neutral subject for regional broadcasting, vis-à-vis Western news outlets, such as MSNBC or CNN (201-202). Would this have even been a modern reality had it not been for the West?
It’s a question worth considering when discussing the evolution of Arab television. Many media scholars and Arab television moguls alike have heralded the Kuwait crisis of 1990-1991 as a major turning-point in this media landscape. It was during this tumultuous period in the Middle East when Arab political leaders and entrepreneurs watched the crisis unfold on CNN (for it was during this time when satellites were still a luxury item reserved for the wealthy and prestigious), and realized that the U.S. network provided a much more sophisticated and interesting program than local broadcasts (211). It was from that moment that Western television began to truly influence the way that politics and commercialism mixed in this region, and helped entrepreneurs to formulate new ways to rehash Western television templates to awaiting media audiences in the region.
II. Current Programmatic Trends in Arab Television
a. Overview
The Arab television landscape is certainly one that is on par with what can be found in the West: a plethora of channels that are devoted to a wide variety of subjects, including news, entertainment, talk shows, sports, and music videos. Hussein Amin predicts that satellite broadcasting will soon be “reaching thousands of channels,” with people of all income and education levels having access to a wide array of programming (2). Just like in the United States, television provides the majority of the population with its fill of news and entertainment, quenching its media diet through a very wide array of programming.
Dina Matar, although writing particularly about the advent of more feminist-driven television broadcasting in the Arab world, constructs a fascinating picture of the shifting media panorama in the Arab world at the beginning of this century, when she writes that it is “creating new social and power dynamics in the region. … transnational satellite broadcasting[, in particular, is] providing new spaces for diverse … views of contemporary life in the region and putting forward diverse role models from across the political, social, economic, and religious spectrum” (Matar 513). It is a stunning fact to consider, given the completely skewed ideas about the Arab world’s communications landscape in the West.
b. What Is Available?
The landscape of Arab television’s programming choices is truly astonishing, and provides evidence against narrow-minded Western ideas of what television in this region of the world is like. Reality TV has proven to be a major player in this landscape, tipping its hat to the easily-reproducible formats of such shows: the Arabic version of “Who Wants To Be A Millionaire?” was the highest-rated show on Middle East television (“Brand America” 261). Other examples of “reality”-based television programs include “Super Star” (the Arab version of “American Idol”; produced by Lebanese channel Future Television), “Star Academy” (the Arab version of “Fame Academy”; broadcasted by LBC), and “Al Ra’is” (the Arab version of “Big Brother”; launched by MBC) (Kraidy 6).
Other popular shows include:
• talk shows: “Across the Ocean” is broadcasted from Washington and explores U.S. policy toward the Arab world;
• documentary series: “Witness” features independent short films that cover a range of globally-recognizable themes, particularly conflict;
• socio-political programs: “From Iraq” uncovers the realities in Iraq by examining the sufferings of Iraqi people through a range of media;
• Western political debate-format shows: “The Opposite Direction” (modeled after CNN’s “Crossfire”) invites guests with opposing opinions to debate a controversial political topic, and often features exiles;
• morning shows: “Alam al Sabah” was the first morning show to be launched in the Arab world and includes a wide array of topics found on such shows in the United States as “Good Morning America”;
• women’s issues shows: “Kalam Nawaem” is modeled after ABC’s “The View” whereby four women discuss news and current hot women’s topics in a heated debate format;
• sex shows: “Big Talk” features the Arab world’s first Muslim sexologist, Dr. Heba Kotb, who answers questions about sex from Muslim women around the Middle East;
• entertainment shows: “Ikka” is a weekly entertainment program that features two different teams, each equipped with a celebrity guest, that compete over trivia
(source: “Dishing Democracy: Arab TV Guide”)
c. The Point of Regionalization and Programming Trends
Over the past fifteen years, Arab media has developed along a path of regionalization, whereby Arab satellite television in particular produces programs that appeal at once to audiences throughout the Arab world, although it primarily has its gaze fixed on “urban middle-class viewers that appeal to advertisers” (Kraidy 7).
d. The Question of Globalization
As stated above, producers in the Arab television market are more prone to sticking with programming templates that work (not that much unlike those in the West), which is regarding to as “’safe’ programming,” despite the wide array of interests and audiences that come with such a large market of people. For the most part, this has led to an almost superfluous reliance upon imported foreign programs that are “Arabized,” the most popular among them being “non-scripted reality” programming and game shows (Masrieh 2).
Globalization is, albeit, a simplistic way to explain the evolution of Arab television programming, but it certainly gets the job done. As mentioned in previous subsections, it is clear that without the influence of Western media models, Arab television would not be where it is today. Programs that are Western in origin were adapted by Arab producers for two simple reasons: they have proven to be successful, and they have proven to be entertaining. While Arab media producers would have certainly created their own programming that is unique to their own culture and regional milieu, and they do, globalization can most definitely be pointed to as the stimulus for the increase in the variety of options offered by Arab television.
III. CURRENT U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN ARAB TELEVISION
a. What Is Our Role?
It is clear that the United States is no stranger to “Orientalist” ideas regarding the Middle East: our own media portrays individuals of the Arab world in stereotypical lights that are truly unfounded and based upon extreme, racist generalizations of a population. The notion that the United States’ involvement in the Arab television landscape is based on the premise of countering anti-Western propaganda is not as founded as people are wont to believe, and the notion that it is based on the premise of countering anti-Western propaganda just goes to prove how long we have to come as a national – and even global – community in overcoming the socially-constructed “West vs. the Rest” dichotomy.
b. The Lesson of al-Hurra
It is clear that the United States needs to reform its presence in Arab television, or get out entirely. Ventures such as al-Hurra have proven to be disastrous, to say the least, to our nation’s public image in that part of the world. This was highlighted in Kenneth Tomlinson’s speech before Congress two days before the launch of al-Hurra in 2004, when he confidently stated that our nation’s “competitive edge in the Middle East is our very dedication to the truth and free and open debate. …. And we will stand out like a beacon of light in a media market dominated by sensationalism and distortion” (“Brand America” 259). Tomlinson also wrote in a featured article on Arab Media & Society that such media ventures on behalf of the United States in the Middle East “were created to serve information-deprived societies” (1). However, taking into account the damning evidence recorded above regarding the stunning breadth and depth of Arab television broadcasting, it is clear that somebody didn’t do their homework, and we are all to blame.
c. What Should We Do?
With academic scholarship – and people on the ground in the Arab world – point to the clear fact that the United States have approached it in an incorrectly-directed manner, how can we possibly deny that our current strategy isn’t working? As Gordon R. Robison, a Senior Fellow at the USC Center on Public Diplomacy and the Director of the Middle East Media Project, writes in “The Rest of Arab Television,” our national mediatized perception of Arab television is that of “endless anti-American rants disguised as news, along with parades of dictators[, which] is far from the truth. In fact, Arab viewers, just like viewers in the U.S., turn to television looking for entertainment first and foremost (2).
As Hussein Amin writes, “What fits one society does not necessarily fit or reflect the will of another” (3), and that is something that the United States should heed. Although it may seem idealistic, I believe that it would behoove both cultures if there were established some sort of camaraderie and appreciation for one another’s culture, while trying to bridge “Orientalist” (and even “reverse-Orientalist”) gaps in thinking and relating to one another. When those gaps are closed and socially-constructed feelings of superiority eradicated, then the United States would be more successful in programming in the Arab region, if that is what we desire. However, a part of me feels as though we really should just leave their media landscape, which, again, most certainly seems idealist. In my experience and expertise, however, it is blindingly apparent that one’s media is reflective of one’s culture, and by establishing media in a developing region of the world that is not reflective of the indigenous culture, then we are setting the stage for major issues of cultural identity in an albeit “shrinking” world. I, personally, would be interested in seeing how broadcasting in the Arab world would look if the West did not assert itself. Shall we give it a shot?
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