Given our current state of globalization and global affairs, media is used – and is necessary – to disperse the concept of the “clash of civilizations.” In our modern, fast-forwarded world, we need those stereotypes generated by the notion of the “clash” because we typically don’t have the time to learn the nuances behind the argument. The “clash” is a reductionist argument to the extent that we rely on those aforementioned stereotypes in order to satiate our understanding about other civilizations and our relationships to them in a simplified, easily understandable way. Regardless of its inaccuracy on several levels, it is a necessary evil in our postmodern, media-engulfed age.
The founding father of the “clash” theory, Bernard Lewis, discusses in his thesis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” how in our post-Cold War world, divisions still exist amongst peoples of varying ideologies, particularly between the West and the Muslim world. Lewis presents this as a strict dichotomy of civilizations that becomes readily familiar with the argument, as a clash between those who share the same values and ideals that “we” do and those who don’t, also known as “‘good’ Muslims versus ‘bad’ Muslims” binary.
Lewis discusses that this kind of animosity that the Muslim world harbors against Western civilization has existed since for centuries, and how it has only gotten fiercer within the last one, what with the explosion of wars, commercialism, and the recent globalization phenomenon. The ideological collisions over culture and politics between the two binaries are damning representations of the “soulless American imperialist empire,” with Western ideals being the catalysts behind the clash, and – in Lewis’s opinion – not in a particularly negative way. With all of these bombardments of the Muslim world, Lewis argues for a laissez-faire approach to the turmoil within the Muslim world, stating how it is not our business as to how they handle the onslaught of Western ideals, and that we must allow the population to deal with their problems amongst themselves – that we can pry, but “at the end of the day, the modernization process can only come from Muslims figuring it out for themselves” (“The Clash, as Imagined”).
Samuel Huntington, the proud disciple of Lewis, makes the argument more complex and thus a more detailed insight into the idea of the “clash.” In his thesis, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Huntington no longer utilizes the strict divide between two sectors as the crutch for the argument, but rather expands it to nine civilizations, with the divisions being based on culture and, thus, irreconcilable differences. Huntington takes a page from Lewis’s argument by stating how we should not just be spectators to the Muslim plight, but we must take an active role in order to maintain control and dominance over the world: we, meaning, the West. There is, essentially, a three-pronged approach to Huntington’s argument: we can allow countries to be isolated, OR they can join and integrate with the West, OR they can try to become modern without necessarily Westernizing (“The Clash, as Imagined”). For the sake of the Western world and its global dominance, he argues, we should direct the Muslim world from the first and third options.
As Huntington notes, civilizations are now distinguished by the cultures that envelop them; he points out due to this evolution of people defining their identity in terms of religion and ethnicity, “they are likely to see an ‘”us” versus “them”’ relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion” (29). This “good versus bad,” “us versus them,” “good versus evil” motif is prevalent in the arguments of Lewis, Huntington, George W. Bush, and Osama bin Laden, in an effort to streamline the case of the “clash” in favor of one civilization over another, and to propel the notion that – in the immortalized words of Bush – “you’re either with us, or you’re against us,” and that your choice is vital.
Huntington’s argument for the “clash” frames the world s a perpetual struggle between peoples and their evolution of important ideologies. As he writes, “the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism, fascism-Nazism, and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy,” and then, when the Cold War ceased, the struggle became “between the West and non-Western civilizations” (23).
What’s fascinating is bin Laden’s take on the “clash argument”: he boils it down to a battle between “Muslims … and the global Crusaders” (Lawrence 108), and that “it is a known fact that America is against the establishment of any Islamic state” (110). bin Laden’s invocation of religious weight to the “clash” is on par with Lewis, stating that “this [Clash of Civilizations] is a very clear matter, proven in the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet, and that any true believer who claims to be faithful shouldn’t doubt these truths (124), not only lending religious support to the “clash,” but also to the antiquated “us versus them” argument discussed by Lewis.
The clash can be argued, then, as being a “static representation of the evolution of societies,” failing to take into account historical nuances that have accelerated the very notion of a “clash,” if one chooses to accept the argument as the way to explain the current state of global affairs (“Cultural and Political”). What Lewis and Huntington overlook are the other components of history that have led to the evolution of the world, choosing religion as the focal point over socio-politics and the static nature of history. When we reduce history to a “clash” of “good versus evil,” “premodern versus modern versus postmodern,” “developed versus undeveloped,” “West versus Other,” “us versus them,” aren’t we doing more harm than good?
Akbar Ahmed takes a similar approach to Huntington and Lewis, although insinuates that the “clash” approach is an understatement: that, instead, what we are talking about is “a straight-out fight between two approaches to the world … one is based in secular materialism, the other in faith,” and that what is occurring in our world, then, is far more complicated (46-7). Ahmed, too, chooses to give a more nuanced explanation behind the state of the Islamic world and its mediated representation, representing it as known what it’s doing, of knowing why It’s choosing to not fully engage in the Western lifestyle, knowing that it “diverges from their own vision of society” (51) and that “the Muslim lives … in the real world, but within the frame of religion” (55).
The clash is a problematic perspective, given that no matter which side you look at it from, it is “monolithic in approach”: it produces too broad of a perception of what civilizations actually stand for and are composed of, and thus pits one fundamental generalization against another (“The Clash, as Imagined”). The argument is also fatalist in approach: with two sides going at it, the constant friction will lead to one disappearing… or, if the friction is equal, both will explode. The argument also produces a very strict binary that is hard to overcome: that if you look at the “clash” from the “Other’s” side, then you are wrong. Huntington makes this case when he proposes that civilizations are separated amongst “fault lines” of cultural differences, which is an interesting metaphor not to be overlooked: when considered in terms of plate tectonics, constant friction amongst plate boundaries causes one of three things to happen. These three phenomena are collision, divergence, and transformation… and none of the outcomes are hopeful for coexistence.
The media’s construction of the “Other” is one of the most important negative consequences of the “clash,” and Western media is not entirely innocent of keeping the Muslim world’s anxieties at bay. As Ahmed quotes, “Nothing in history has threatened Muslims like the Western media,” what with its speed and tenacity and non-traditional leanings (47). The media are an incredibly strong force that can all but obliterate an opposing culture, between stereotypes and as “an extension of political arguments” (49).
Mahmood Mamdani’s argument against the “clash” is vital, as it disengages the momentum with which Lewis and Huntington’s argument propels. As discussed in lecture on 24 September 2008, the “clash” proposes that there is “some sort of constant, essential, fundamental truth that never changes,” and yet, as Mamdani points out, civilizations are much more in flux, changing with the tides of socio-politics (“Cultural and Political”).
In Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, Mamdani argues that “rather than illustrating a deep-seated clash of civilizations … political clashes came out of recent history, that of the late Cold War” (11), which puts the “clash” argument into a more appropriate socio-political context. Mamdani also reflects on how this current era in which we live is marked by the “rapid politicizing of … culture,” and how this is a problematic notion, given that politics and culture are entities that compose civilizations. Mamdani also discusses how the notion of “good” Muslims and “bad” Muslims refer strictly to the political identities of the population, not to identities founded in culture and/or religion, and that “the presumption that there are such categories masks a refusal to address our own failure to make a political analysis of our times,” addressing one of the main flaws of the “clash” argument: that is does not dive deep into the issue at hand, but instead chooses to make broad political and cultural assumptions without taking into account the nuances that make up every civilization (17).
Media create the notion of the “Other” – we are not immune to it, but we do have the ability to distinguish right from wrong. The “clash” creates a culture war, which is ultimately irreconcilable… unless we use brute force, which won’t necessarily end in our favor, as we are seeing in the “War on Terror.” If populations are “set in their ways” and culture thus dictating certain worldviews and ideas, then isn’t it best to leave them be, as to not drum up resistance that cannot be overcome if such ideas are so embedded? The “clash” is a flawed argument – it creates the notion of a cultural binary that has been the topic of fairytales and other means of ideological dispersion since storytelling began, the notion of “good” winning over “evil” and that there is no other way to read the struggle and the people involved in it. This notion has only increased in strength with media globalization, whereby issues have become streamlined, easily digestible sound bytes and images that we don’t need to question, because they adhere to already-embedded stereotypes and ideologies inherent in our own culture.
What does it mean to be in a culture of language, where language has no value? The old mantra of “Actions speak louder than words” is certainly applicable both for and against the “clash” argument: whether we stand back and approve of the sense of “Otherness” generated by the “clash” and the media, or decide to not accept them, is a testament to our own feelings in regard to a strict binary. As discussed in previous lectures, the “clash” can be easily critiqued as being reductionist and normative, which legitimizes our seeing through a mediated lens of our own creation, when – in fact – the world and the populations that occupy it are a lot more multifaceted and, thus, more complicated than a black-and-white strategy utilized in order to categorize populations and make cultural differences easier to digest (“Cultural and Political”).
The media feeds us with the “clash” argument as being a valid argument, a “West versus the Rest” war of ideologies that is unavoidable and an effect of our globalized era. For those populations within our own culture who do not have the resources – nor the inclination – to question what the media presents as the truth about the “Other,” these images and ideas created and propelled by talk show pundits and journalists are the only means by which those aforementioned populations and subjected to those “Other” cultures, thus drumming up support for the “clash” through stereotypes and a false sense of cultural superiority, when in fact the fact is a reductionist – and therefore inaccurate – means to illustrate global affairs. The “clash” is simply a mater of convenience and, as stated earlier, a somewhat necessary evil in our globalized world, where actions and generalizations are accepted more readily than intricate descriptions… simply because our notion of time creates apathy.
Works Cited
Ahmed, Akbar S. “Media Moguls at the Gates of Baghdad.” New Perspectives Quarterly. Winter 2002: 46-62.
Huntington, Samuel. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs. 72.3 (1993): 22-49.
Lawrence, Bruce. Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden. Trans. James Howarth. New York: Verso, 2005.
Lewis, Bernard. “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” The Atlantic Monthly. 266.3 (1990): 47-60.
Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terrorism. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004.
Tawil-Souri, Helga. “The Clash, as Imagined in the U.S.” ILA: Islam, Media, and the West. New York University, New York, NY. 15 Sept. 2008.
Tawil-Souri, Helga. “Cultural and Political Critiques.” ILA: Islam, Media, and the West. New York University, New York, NY. 24 Sept. 2008.