U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Report on Arab Television
Molly N Callanan
Table of Contents
Abstract p.3
Description and Analysis of the Arab Media Landscape:
Structure of the TV Landscape p. 3
Private Ownership v. State Control p. 3
Competition and Commercialism p. 4
Programmatic Trends p. 5
News Programming p.5
Reality TV p. 5
Women’s Programming p. 5
Religious Programming p. 6
US Involvement p. 7
Recommendations p. 7
Works Cited p. 8
Abstract:
“The changing media landscape in the Arab world at the beginning of the twenty-first century is said to be creating new social and power dynamic in the region” (Matar 513).
The catalyst for the change in the Arab television landscape came from the development of satellite technology and economic upheavals of the 1990s. With the move from state control to private ownership, the overall trend moved toward commercialism and freedom of media. Abundant and diverse programming marks the post-90s television landscape. The media content is simply a reflection of culture, which allows for a difference in opinion that occasionally makes the content seem anti-American. Suggestions for tactics to include a stronger, more accepted American voice in the region are included at the end of the report.
Description and Analysis of the Arab Media Landscape:
Structure of the TV Landscape:
Private Ownership v. State Control:
Television was first introduced to the Middle East through their colonial powers, who gave control to the newly established governments after liberation. Thus, the first television programs were state controlled and can be viewed as tools of propaganda for the current administration. The first television model was created in the image of the BBC, using a public service model that was supposed to educate the masses through the top-down model and foster a sense of national unity and loyalty (Tawil Souri 11.3.08).
Before the 1990s, Arab television was defined by three structural formats: strict government control, loyalist, and ‘free.’ Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Iran followed strict government control. Countries such as Qatar and Tunisia maintained a loyalist system, following along the party lines, despite the fact that the government did not control production. Lebanon and Israel maintained a separation between the government and television production, and “were free” to choose their broadcast material (Tawil Souri 11.3.08).
This changed following the Gulf War and the explosion of satellite television during the 1990s. During the Gulf War, the Arab community was forced to rely on Western media sources (CNN, etc.) in order to keep up to date with the unfolding events. This prompted the Middle East to look into developing their own media sources, creating an Arab perspective in the news (Tawil Souri 11.3.08). Compounded with the economic upheaval in the area, and the subsequent bailout by the IMF and World Bank, satellite television prompted a new freer system (Tawil Souri 11.3.08). The strict control exercised by the state gave way to privately owned, and funded, television channels. Egypt was the first country to extensively use the medium, though the satellite revolution was lead by the Gulf States and the Lebanese (Hammond 209). A group of Saudi businessmen set up the MBC (Middle East Broadcasting) in London, allowing them to escape from government censorship and control (Hammond 209). After the MBC, Qatar established the Al Jazeera channel, which was developed with the intention of “taking the Arab world by storm” (Hammond 210). The overall movement of the television landscape was away from strict control and toward a freer system of production.
However, this is not to say that nationalized, strict-control models do not still exist in the contemporary media landscape. Sudan, Iran and Libya are still state controlled. Loyalist structured media also remains relatively unchanged in their efforts to depict a positive image of the state, and can be found in the majority of the Gulf countries (Tawil Souri 11.3.08). Diverse structures have minimal government involvement, and are used in Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco and Yemen (Tawil Souri 11.3.08). There are also transitional structures of media, which are moving from the older, strict control models, toward a freer television industry. These models can be found in Egypt, Jordan, and post-2003 Iraq (Tawil Souri 11.3.08).
Competition and Commercialism:
As satellite television took over in the Arab television landscape, channels were forced into fierce competition with each other. Thus, channels moved away from the old public-service model and toward a more capitalist model of media. The new satellite channels also had to choose between “free-to-air commercial broadcasting, which would carry advertising or fee-based subscription broadcasts” (Rugh 218). Those that do choose to advertise, find that they cannot cover all of their costs through advertising alone (Rugh 218). Given the transnational nature of satellite television, it is difficult to create an advertising campaign that speaks to the entire audience and as a consequence advertising is not studied within the media landscape and needs further study as satellite television grows. The most lucrative advertising market in the region is Saudi Arabia, which makes sense given the overall wealth of the country (Rugh 219). The varying economic positions of the audience also have to be taken into effect when considering advertising, since many products simply do not make sense for different segments of the audience.
Programmatic Trends:
Within the Arab television landscape, the diversity of the community has a direct correlation on the varied and diverse programming available. While the West has a tendency to reduce the diversity of Middle Eastern programming by claiming state funding limits the speech of the program producers, this is simply not the case. Arab television is based on a Western model and as a result maintains the same range and scale of programming enjoyed in the West. The Middle East has built on the original model provided by the West and modified it to suit their own cultural needs and tastes. The post-90s satellite television allowed for the creation of the new public sphere, television, which gave a voice to the previously unheard population and produced a new counter-culture (Matar).
News Programming:
Within the Arab TV landscape, each satellite channel has the capacity to produce news with a unique perspective. Depending on the country of origin or the politics of the group broadcasting, content can be biased toward the host country and critical of those who are not allies of the government. A prime example of such a struggle can be seen in the broadcasts of the Lebanese Broadcast Channel and Al Manar. The LBC is largely pro-government for the current administration, while Hezbollah funded Al Manar advocates a different set of politics. The sectarianism that is a part of Lebanese culture comes across in the news programming as the different channels trade political insults and skewed coverage of events (Cochrane).
Even Al Jazeera falls victim to this plight. The network has built its reputation on tackling controversial issues, which has labeled the channel a “threat to the very hegemony and ideology of Arab regimes whose ‘survival instinct…continue to pre-empt any liberalizing impulse of satellite TV’” (Zayani 3). While network is state funded, it is thought to have editorial freedom. Yet, Qatar is quick to allow Al Jazeera to lambaste Egypt (Hammond 212). The two countries now spar with each other through their respective channels and use the media to further criticize the enemies of the state. However, this does not detract from the popularity of the channel within the pan-Arab community (Tawil-Souri).
Reality TV:
Reality TV is extremely popular within the Arab TV landscape. “Most of the reality programs were copies of internationally patented shows, such as Star Academy and Big Brother” though some are original products (Hammond 227). Middle Eastern reality TV has the same diversity found in Western television, including dating shows, game shows, and hidden camera shows (Hammond 228). These shows are extremely popular given that they have low production costs, which work well for the channels that are low on capital. These programs tend to place men and women together in communal situations, which has a tendency to cause controversy within strict Islamic circles.
Women’s Programming:
While there is a propensity in the West to believe that women and their interests are largely ignored in the Middle East that is not the case. Women have a distinct voice within the television landscape. There is programming directed toward the women audience, and women newscasters are common during newscasts. Kalam Nawaem (Sweet Talk) is a women’s talk show that tackles controversial issues that are taboo within the Middle East. Four women from around the region discuss different topics and have a transnational appeal due to their varied backgrounds ([wide angle]). Heya also established the “first pan-Arab television station among 205 Arab satellite channels to specifically target Arab women audiences” (Matar). The channel offers a means of changing women’s historical position from a silenced group into one with a loud and well-represented voice.
Religious Programming:
“Modeled after American televangelism and religious entertainment, Islamic broadcasting seeks a simple moderate message that rebukes radicalism and makes religion cool” (Echchaibi). In the satellite TV landscape, Islamic programming is looking to popularize the religion, while being true to the tenets of the faith. This can be seen in Amr Khaled, “the Arab world’s first Islamic tele-evangelist…using the barrier-breaking power of satellite TV and the internet to turn around a generation of lost Muslim youth” (Khaled). The new religious programming helps to give voice and direction to those confused with the conflicting messages of Islam’s true meaning.
US Involvement:
Al Hurra TV and Radio Sawa act as the voice of the US in the Middle East. Launched in 2003, and 2004 respectively, the channels were started under the belief that if the right things are broadcasted, things will change (Tawil Souri 11.3.08). The channels were meant to counteract the bad publicity generated by the Al Jazeera’s broadcasts that occasionally painted a poor picture of American political and military actions. While the networks may have been started with the best of intentions, but the programs’ blatantly biased perspective has turned off a large part of the Middle Eastern population. Alhurra’s founders believed that the Arab world was like the former Soviet space, deprived of information and desperate for an objective, credible source of news and free public debate” (Lynch). Some of the problems with Alhurra had to with its management, others with more structural problems. Obviously the US should not continue with its current strategy. In a poll of Iraqi viewers, Al Hurra only holds 14% of the overall viewers in the Middle East. That is not to say that the viewers depend solely on Al Hurra, simply that they tuned into the channel the day before the survey was taken (Snyder).
Recommendations:
The US should reconsider their role in the Middle East and adapt their broadcasting style to better suit the audience. Al Hurra should take note from Al Jazeera and offer more diversity in their programming. Inviting on prominent figures from the Arab community to discuss issues with members of the US administration would be an excellent way to get back in the good graces of the Middle Eastern viewers. While we may have an agenda, the point is to appear like we are more interested in giving a more balanced perspective and less biased programming. Withdrawing completely from the Middle East would only confirm the fact that the West wants nothing to do with the East. This would only fuel the belief that the West is prejudiced against the East. Another step in dissolving such rumors would be to allow for the broadcasting of channels such as Al Jazeera within the US. The best solution would be to make an effort to first understand Middle Eastern culture, then to find a common ground where both cultures could agree to fair representations. It is not enough to have a presence in the Arab TV landscape if our presence only further alienates those with whom we are trying to court favor; we must take steps to understand before we can fully persuade our audience.
Works Cited:
“Amr Khaled: Islam’s Billy Graham.” The Independent (UK) 4 January 2006.
Cochrane, Paul. “Bombs and broadcasts: Al Manar’s battle to stay on air.” Arab Media and Society. < http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=19>
Echchaibi, Nabil. “From the pulpit to the studio: Islam’s internal battle.” WACC. 13 November 2008.
Hammond, Andrew. Popular Culture in the Arab World.
“Kalam Nawaem.” Dishing Democracy. PBS 31, July 2007.
Lynch, Marc. “The Alhurra Project: Radio Marti of the Middle East.” Arab Media and Society. June 2007. < http://www.arabmediasociety.com/topics/index.php?t_article=146>
Matar, Dina. “Heya TV: A Feminist Counterpublic for Arab Women?” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. 27.3 (2007): 513-524.
Rugh, William A. Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics. Connecticut, Praeger.
Snyder, Alvin. “The Great Alhurra Debate.” Arab Islamic Public Diplomacy. 7 December 2005. < http://islamicpublicdiplomacy.blogspot.com/2005/12/great-alhurra-debate.html>
Tawil Souri, Helga. The History of TV & Radio. ILA: Islam, Media and the West. New York University, NY, NY. 3 November 2008.
Zayani, Mohamed. “Introduction—Al Jazeera and the Vicissitueds of the New Arab Mediascape.”