One of the great ironies to mark hacking is the fact that mainstream public perception of hackers is based on the idea that hacking is totally immoral and yet the actual history of hacking shows that many hackers are in fact quite obsessed with ethical questions and with what Steven Levy defined decades ago as the "hacker ethic."
But what if the question of ethics is simply the wrong question to be asking? This is what Brian Harvey suggests in this old but thought provoking piece, which we read last week, where he argues that:
"Steven Levy, in the book Hackers, talks at length about what he calls the ``hacker ethic.'' This phrase is very misleading. What he has discovered is the Hacker Aesthetic, the standards for art criticism of hacks. For example, when Richard Stallman says that information should be given out freely, his opinion is not based on a notion of property as theft, which (right or wrong) would be an ethical position. His argument is that keeping information secret is inefficient; it leads to unaesthetic duplication of effort. "
I think he raises some important question about what we mean by ethics in the first place as well as about the relationship between aesthetics and ethics.
An older, Greek, definition of ethics as virtue did not separate aesthetics and ethics so starkly in so far as Greek philosophy emphasized ethics as the virtuous and good life, rooted in the fulfillment of excellence. But even if you separate these two domains, one interesting question remains, when might the aesthetic become the ethical?
One can argue that the relationship between aesthetics and ethics in hacking concerns the broader issue of productive autonomy: the constellation of institutions, social norms, legal devices, and moral codes that hackers have created and draw upon in order to autonomously improve on the work of peers, refine their technical skills, and extend engineering traditions. Their actions, their guidelines, their norms however strike as ethical not for any inherent reason but because they sit in tension with mainstream proprietary models of knowledge in general and software in specific. So if we take a relational instead of ontological view of ethics, we can see how hacker aesthetics commitments are also ethical ones.
I have always wondered in fact whether Levy in Hackers identified the hacker ethic when he did and as he did (he noted that hackers did not themselves talk about ethics; he interpreted their actions as ethical) because this was a moment of crisis—a crisis of social reproduction to be specific—among the MIT hackers.
That is, the early 1980s was just the time when copyrights and patents were creeping into the world of software, when lucrative companies were hiring programmers, when NDAs were becoming more common, when in short, the aesthetics of hacking was forced to move into ethical territory. Stallman reacted to the evisceration of his MIT hacker community with what was clearly an ethical response: he established the idea and institution of Free Software aimed as cultural preservation and political advocacy. Perhaps it was just this crisis, these set of responses, that allowed Levy to identify the ethics of software freedom.