I think that a common theme amongst the blogs – or at least the theme that was most apparent and therefore probably most interesting to me – was the realization of how villailnized Arab people and Muslim people are in the United States and how the government and media have done this systematically and, oftentimes, intentionally as well. Another was the shock and disbelief at the way the American government has obscured the truth from its citizens. Where Al Jazeera shows all the gory, bloody, and terrible truth – albeit somewhat sensationally – the U.S. government has not allowed Osama Bin Laden’s speeches on television in America. My belief is honestly that no resolution or understanding can come from a conflict when the other side is not allowed to air its opinions and views, as unreasonable and violent as their tactics and strategies have been. And, of course, the U.S. has prevented the other side form understanding our intentions and views as well by concealing the real reasons for our “defensive” actions through stupid and unsuccessful PR machines like Al Hurra and Radio Sawa. It seems like the U.S. is constantly trying to pull the wool over everybody’s eyes, and we’re shocked that they’ve done this so well without many of us knowing.

I think another very important theme that seems widespread amongst the blogs is a much higher understanding of why the Middle East is structured the way it is now (the British, of course) and why they have reacted in the way that they have as well as their reasons for behaving in this way. I think that previously, many people did think that perhaps the Middle East was a violent place that was inherently violent and conflicted. Now knowing the history behind this region, it seems much more likely that instead of a Clash of Civilizations (where the Occident is developed and civilized and modern, trying to subdue an evil Orient that is primitive and angry and violent), it is the Middle East having a reaction to the atrocities that the Occident has committed towards them and their people. Without this historical and political context, it is easy to see and believe the Middle East as a place that is innately “bad,” while the West is a place that is innately “good.” It is easy to see through Orientalist lens that people like Thomas Friedman and the rest of the media have given us.

I think it really shows a lot that, even as media and communication students, we had trouble with media literacy in relation to the Middle East. This class definitely seems to have improved media literacy for those of us who did not know much about the Middle East before this semester (as evidenced by a few posts I read on my classmates’ blogs on their realization of the importance of utilizing different news sources), and I think that a lot of it has to do with the historical context that we were provided and also the portrayal of the opinions and views of the other side (not “the other”). The autobiographical accounts (and of course Palestine) that we read seems to have affected some of my classmates the way it affected me, making me rethink the way I once thought of the people of Muslims and people of the Middle East. The contrast between the story that the U.S. media and government tells us and the story that Al Jazeera and Joe Sacco has told us is so drastically different, and we have to find ways to reconcile these two views in our minds. This class has definitely taught me to look deeper, and it seems to have taught others in our class to do so as well.

TABLE OF CONTENTS:
STRUCTURE OF THE ARAB TELEVISION INDUSTRY
Ownership
-Channels and Owners
-Funding
-Ownership and Control
State Control
-Range
-Satellite and Censorship
Competition
Role of Advertising
-Dependence on Government
-Lack of Advertising

CURRENT PROGRAMMATIC TRENDS
News
Interactivity
Variety
Adaptations

US INVOLVEMENT IN ARAB TELEVISION
Al Hurra
Reasons for Al Hurra’s Failure
Other Attempts
Anti-Western Propaganda?
Suggestions
-News
-Advertising

BIBLIOGRAPHY

THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARAB TELEVISION INDUSTRY

Ownership
Channels and Owners:
MBC was started by Saudi businessmen, while Orbit has “close links to the Saudi royal family” (Hammond 209). In Lebanon, Future TV is partially owned by the former prime minister, Rafiq Hariri, and LBC “is controlled by a board dominated by ministers and officials close to the Syrian government” (Sakr). Meanwhile, MBC belongs to Shaikh Walid bin Ibrahim al-Ibrahim, a relative of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd and Al Jazeera is annually financed with $30 million by the Emir of Qatar (Sakr; Zayani 10).

Funding:
“Most television systems in the Arab world are subsidized by the government partly because they need a great deal of money and partly because Arab governments have a stake in the media,” such as Saudi Arabia (Zayani 14, 15).

Ownership and Control:
In the Arab world, there is a general trend of the “politicization of media ownership,” meaning “the media in general, and satellite channels in particular, operate under a patron who is either government or some rich owner who in many cases is associated, in one way or another, with the ruling elite or government (Zayani 14).

However, it would be inaccurate to claim these people promote the governments’ agendas. Someone who is has connections in the government may have self-interest in mind or business interests in addition to or instead of government agendas (Khazen).

State Control
Range:
State control of television in the Arab world varies drastically in the Arab world from what may be considered the freest of all channels, Al Jazeera – which is “not government-controlled, but is nonetheless government owned” – to state controlled channels such as Al-Iraqiya (Zayani 17).

Satellite and Censorship:
In general, satellite TV is “impossible to control” (Khazen). “By transcending borders, satellite broadcasts are technically capable of circumventing national controls. Several channels serving Middle Eastern audiences are based outside the region,” such as previously London-based MBC (Sakr).

However, some countries have been slow to relinquish control; there are “twenty-seven Egyptian terrestrial and satellite channels in total, almost all of them fully government-owned” (Hammond 214).

This is no surprise, as historically in the Arab world, media was government controlled prior to independently owned Arab satellite stations and spewed propaganda, such as what Nasser and the PLO sanctioned, leaving people to turn to CNN, BBC World and Voice of America for information on the world” (Hammond 208; Heemsbergen 1).

Competition
The Arab world is frequently described as “media congested” (Zayani 26). There are around three hundred satellite channels, encompassing a wide range of subjects, but “few of them are professional in terms of content management and audience retention” (Hammond 216).

As well, “this proliferation of satellites has made it possible for smaller operators to compete with propaganda-manufacturing oil lobbies and it has reduced the latter’s revenues by fragmenting audiences” (Mernissi).

Role of Advertising
Media outlets rely on advertising. Advertising depends on viewer numbers. However, because “advertising is tied to political considerations and succumbs to outside pressures,” advertising can be hard to procure in Arab media (Zayani 15).

Dependence on Government:
Al Jazeera survived its first few years without airing commercials consistently (Zayani 15). This, no doubt, is due to funding by the Emir of Qatar. “It is the case that some kind of subsidies, whether by state or by individuals, will continue to be necessary to the survival of much of the Arab media” (Khazen).

Lack of Advertising:
Advertising would free the Arab media from state control, but advertising expenditure is low in the Arab world compared to Western and Israeli standards (Khazen). “In global terms, Arab advertising revenue is tiny--only about a third of 1 percent of that of the world media” (Khazen).

CURRENT PROGRAMMATIC TRENDS

News
The Second Gulf War was important to the development of Arab TV broadcasting. CNN, especially, with its 24-hour news coverage, had a great effect. It became an important information outlet, “providing alternative news coverage which changed media practices and audiences’ expectations.” (Zayani 29).

CNN “gave people in the Arab world and beyond a sense of how powerful the media can be, galvanized the development of Arab satellite broadcasting” (Zayani 30). After that, Arab channels replaced the Western channels, supplying them with “more reliable news, uncensored credible information and better programs than those offered by the heavily regulated state media” (Zayani 30).

This powerful drive for news was new to the Arab world. Some conjecture that this was a result of “westernization or globalization,” that the Arab media was becoming “linked through flows of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and force” to Western media (Heemsbergen 2, 3). This is undeniable, as the obvious effect that CNN had during this time was great, instilling in the Arab people a thirst “for live, unedited and uncensored news during times when state media have fed them stale news” (Zayani 29).

Proof of this can be seen in viewers’ abandonment of MBC for Al Jazeera. Mernissi claims, “MBC’s systematic censorship was projected through the superficiality of its entertainment programs, alienat[ed] viewers… violated citizens’ right to information and reduced talk shows with intellectuals to pitiful masquerades” (Mernissi). Thus, viewers preferred Al Jazeera.

Al Jazeera also “accelerated the institutionalization of new trends in programming… nudging competitors toward live interviews… pushing some channels to display a new savvy for finding stories,” even forcing state media to conform a bit (Zayani 6).

Interactivity
Al Jazeera also initiated the trend of interactivity with its groundbreaking “talk shows with viewer call-ins” (Zayani 6). Because of the call-ins, “Arab viewers are no longer seen as consumers in a one-way communication stream” (Zayani 6). They are capable of debating live on air with politicians and experts.

This is revolutionary because “the kind of debate championed by Al Jazeera is something new in the Arab world where public political debate is considered subversive” (Zayani 6).
But instead, now“all media lobbies… who used to scorn Arab citizens and club them with one-sided propaganda, are now shifting to interactive programming to please viewers” (Mernissi).

Variety
Television seems to be following the “trends of openness and democratization in the Arab world” (Zayani 33). This is partially because “the fact that satellite television is bound, by virtue of its audience of millions of viewers, to compete for market share, forces channels, even the overwhelmingly religious ones to provide for a space for alternative spaces to emerge” (Echchaibi 2).

There is the conservative – “Aylit al-Hagg Metwalli,” a drama about a “patriarchal Cairo clothes merchant who marries an Islamically sanctioned four wives (Hammond 234). There is the middle range of New Age Islam programs – like on Islamic channel Al-Resalah – “modeled after American televangelism and religious entertainment… a simpler, more moderate message that rebukes radicalism and makes religion cool” (Echchaibi 2). And there is also the racy -- Lebanon’s “Carla-la-la,” an example of “pop video channels featuring Arab women in scanty attire” (Hammond 232).

In Syria, there is “‘Buqat daw’ (‘Spotlight’), a comedy series produced, directed, and acted by a group of young actors criticizing corruption, the role of intelligence services in clamping down on freedoms” (Hammond 233). This was unheard of Syria before 2000; “observers reckon the authorities felt it was time to allow some margin of criticism, or a release valve, as economic and political pressures in society increase (Hammond 234).

Adaptations
These, such as copies of “Star Academy,” “Big Brother,” “Who Wants to be a Millionaire?” are popular in the Arab world (Hammond 223). There are also indirect adaptations, such as “The Opposite Direction,” which is based on CNN’s “Crossfire” and “Kalam Nawa’em,” which is based on “The View” (Kraidy 48)

This is reflective of globalization; “co-productions and format adaptations reflect a ‘growing synchronization of the Arab television sector with the global television industry’” (Kraidy 48). This is also due to the lack of state revenues for media production. “These economic factors militates against the commissioning of challenging documentaries or innovative dramas, and means that broadcasters will instead rely on readymade material or imports” (Sakr).

US INVOLVEMENT IN ARAB TELEVISION

Al Hurra
Al Hurra, meaning “the free one,” was launched in 2002 as an alternative to Al Jazeera with aims to provide “accurate, balanced and objective news” and direct access to U.S. policies, but it began immediately as “a mouthpiece of the U.S. government” (Pintak 260, 258).

The channel was clearly propagandistic, and disappointed viewers, e.g., when the “leader of Hamas, Sheikh Amhed Yassin, was assassinated by the Israelis… Al Jazeera, al-Arabia and other Arab satellite channels carried the funeral live. Al-Hurra broadcast a cooking show” (Pintak 259, 260).

According to the Arab Advisors Group, “only 16 per cent of Saudi, 4.6 per cent of Egyptian and 1.3 per cent of Jordanian satellite viewers said they watched al-Hurra, versus the 71 to 88 per cent responses drawn by al-Jazeera” (Pintak 263). Obviously, Al Hurra failed in gaining support for the U.S. and in obtaining an audience.

Reasons for Al Hurra’s Failure
“The rationale behind Al Hurra is based on two erroneous assumptions: that satellite networks are responsible for the anti-Americanism in the Arab world and that once America is more clearly heard, it will be more appreciated” (Zayani 26).

On the opposite end of Al Hurra, “Al-Jazeera’s popularity stemmed directly from the fact that, in a region where the media had always been government controlled, it was largely independent” (Pintak 258). The idea that another government-controlled channel – regardless of it being the U.S. government this time – could capture Arab audiences was plainly misguided.

Other Attempts
American attacks on Al Jazeera, including the bombing of Al Jazeera’s Baghdad bureau and the ousting of Al Jazeera’s New York correspondent from the New York Stock Exchange were failed attempts at controlling Middle Eastern media as well. These attempts seemed only to galvanize Middle Eastern viewers by confirming their suspicions of America’s hypocrisy when it came to free speech and made Al Jazeera more popular in the process (Pintak 163).

The “Shared Values” campaign with “mini-documentaries” about Muslim life in America produced by advertising executives was a failure as well, with critics dismissing it as
“good news propaganda” (Pintak 270).

Anti-Western Propaganda?

Critics are wary of Al Jazeera, the supposed most widely watched and independent news channel in the Arab world (Zayani 6). Some believe that Al Jazeera is “a mouthpiece of Islamic fundamentalists” (Zayani 23). A 2002 Gallup poll also found that “objectivity is perceived as the network’s weakest area,” despite being high in objectivity compared to other networks of the region (Zayani 17).

This means that Al Jazeera is lacking in objectivity and also that other channels are further subjective. However, it is difficult to quantify objectivity. Realistically, “to what extent [can] one can be truly objective when reporting from the Arab world about issues that matter to Arabs the most”? (Zayani 18).

However, a comparison on the effects of CNN International and the BBC versus al-Jazeera found that “for both types of networks, increasing levels of attention to coverage of the U.S. leads to stronger anti-American attitudes’” (Pintak 261). This, then, illustrates the anti-American policy attitude, not a journalistic bias on the part of Al Jazeera.

Suggestions
Continuing with channels such as Al Hurra and campaigns such as “Shared Values”
would be misguided. These clearly propagandistic and reality-obscuring media ventures do not capture Arab audiences or boost their perceptions of U.S. policies. They damage the integrity of the U.S. and continue to promote the U.S. as an oppressive propaganda peddler.

News:
Al Jazeera is respected for its “commitment to daring live unedited news as well as its tendency to broadcast uncut, live pictures,” meaning no censorship or screening (Zayani 5). If the U.S. is to produce another news channel, it would have to match up to the standards that Al Jazeera has set in order to be successful, including the unedited rawness and possibly the interactivity in formatting as well, allowing those who disagree to air their opinions.

It would also have to break news before Al Jazeera, giving the U.S. an “opportunity to frame the story” for Arab viewers, which it failed to do in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s capture (Pintak 280).

In order to guarantee this news channel’s integrity, it should be aired, and be capable of being aired in the U.S. (not in violation of Smith-Mundt Act), assuring that it would be free of propaganda.

Advertising:
Another way to indirectly affect Arab media is through advertising. “In the Middle East advertising remains woefully underdeveloped” (Sakr). Advertising has increased, but “future growth is not assured” (Sakr). This is partially because there are no reliable viewing figures for advertisers to base their media purchases on; “ratings in most countries compiled by unsophisticated methods, leaving analysts skeptical about their accuracy” (Sakr).

The U.S. can encourage companies at home and abroad to advertise in the Arab world in the aims of driving up advertising expenditure and therefore decreasing media outlets’ dependency on government funding. The U.S. can also provide reliable methods to determine viewing figures, ratings, and audience tracking for Arab TV, offering advertisers more assurance in their investments and encourage advertising spending.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Heemsbergen, Luke. "Middle East Media and Knowledge Creation." Quest Journal, University of Belfast, 2007.

Khazen, Jihad. "Censorship and State Control of the Press in the Arab World." The Harvard International Journal of Press Politics 4.3 (1999) 87-92

Sakr, Naomi. "Reform or Reaction: Dilemmas of Economic Development in the Middle East." PublicationNo. 210. Middle East Report. 1999. 6 Dec. 2008

Anyhow, this led to us talking about Egypt, which he was lucky enough to visit over the summer. Steve told me that he went with his mother and they took verrryyyy extreme measures, such as hiding their Star of David necklaces, to hide their Jewish identities. He said they were anxious the whole trip because of the conflict and anti-Jewish/anti-Israeli sentiment. He constantly made jokes about hiding his "Jewishness" in Egypt. However, despite all this, he seemed to have had a great time there. He said that he saw the pyramids, which were "right across the street" from his hotel.

This made me think that he perhaps experienced, to quote "Architourism" again, not "the reality of Islamic Egypt but a cruel Western perversion of it" (20). Perhaps this is why he enjoyed it. He never experienced the actual Muslim Egypt, but an ancient Egypt that worshipped Horus, Osiris, and Ra.

However, as he spoke more about his trip, it seemed he had seen more than just this side of Egypt, as he traveled to many different places throughout Egypt, not simply the pyramids in Cairo. As he described it, it was interesting to see, but it's difficult to say with what lens he viewed Egypt and whether it was a different one than I would have used. He said that, as a Jew, he was worried the whole trip about "being discovered," which leads me to think that perhaps his own slight anti-Muslim attitude may have colored his view on Egypt.

But when I really think about it, wouldn't I be worried as well, simply as a Westerner? In light of the recent attacks at Mumbai, where tourist areas were targeted, it seems that Westerners, regardless of religious affiliation, are also in the crosshairs of those radicals who believe that violence can resolve the conflict in the Middle East.

These "religious extremists," as some would call them, do not exist solely on the side of Muslims, of course. As Steve and I spoke further, the conversation traveled to Hebron. He informed me that a building in Hebron, which is currently inhabited by settlers, is in dispute. Settlers are being forced to vacate it, and they are unwilling to do so, which will probably result in them being removed by force.

Of course, Hebron, which is located in the West Bank, is technically Palestinian territory, the very little territory that the Palestinians now have left after Israel has claimed almost all of what used to be Palestine. Obviously these settlers were being unreasonable. I expressed this to Steve, hoping he wouldn't react sensitively, and I was pleasantly surprised when he agreed, dismissing the settlers by rolling his eyes and calling them "religious extremists." He said that these people believed that all of Israel belonged to the Jews, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, that the Palestinians had no right to be there at all.

According to this article, "About 500 of the settlers live in Hebron in heavily guarded enclaves among 170,000 Palestinians. They see Israel's government as too sympathetic to the Palestinians." Someone knowing all the facts and history of the conflicts relating to Israel could wonder how this statement is even close to being true. However, as members of a religious group which has faced immense amounts of discrimination, hatred, and genocide, some Jews may not find that this statement to be outlandish. They simply believe that Israel is theirs -- their safety, their home -- finally.

Attempting to see it from their eyes makes me understand why they would behave this way. However, they fail to try and see from the perspective from the Muslims and Palestinians. This was once their home as well, and now they have been evicted. And the little land they have is being encroached upon by Jewish settlers who believe that THEIR government is too lenient towards the people that they forced out of their homes. They also fail to see the life hasn't been easy historically for Muslims either.

In "Slumdog Millionaire," there is a scene in which the main character, his brother, and his mother are washing clothes in a river with a large group of others. Suddenly, his mother sees people running towards them with sticks, bats, and various other weapons. They shout something along the lines of, "Get them! They're Muslims!" Then they storm the people, attacking them ruthlessly. The main character's mother is killed in this attack, in the name of Hinduism. Of course, the All Indian Muslim League was not created without reason. And neither was Pakistan. And even after a Muslim country was created for Indian Muslims, conflicts continued to sprout afterwards, for example, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

Any religious group faces persecution, discrimination, and massive amounts of conflict. Apparently, this is unavoidable. I don't mean to be preachy, but perhaps if people were to be more tolerant of one another's beliefs, life would be easier for everyone. Trying to see things from another's perspective will make everyone more understanding and tolerant of those they disagree with or don't understand. I know that much of the reading for this class, especially Palestine and Persepolis, helped me to see more clearly what people in the Middle East are going through and to be more sympathetic of their plight.

It's popular, as I discovered one day in my friend's room: everyone seemed to know the dance moves and the lyrics. It's like the new Soulja Boy song. In fact, a rapper named Arab, who frequently works with Soula Boy, has even created a remix of the song.

When I heard it, I could easily tell, although I wasn't paying much attention to the lyrics, that it was blatantly racist. The song's chorus utilizes stereotypically Arabic-sounding vocals, and the name of the song is ARAB MONEY. They also pronounce it "A-rab" instead of simply "Arab."

Of course, I couldn't resist making a comment about how racist the song was, and my friend informed me that "they're only saying that because they're trying to say they have a lot of money." I then informed him that there are many Arabs who don't have a lot of money, which then somehow turned into a discussion about the N word and how just because you call someone the N word, it doesn't make them black.

Again, I'm not sure what point he was trying to make, but I am sure that the song can definitely be found offensive. Here are the lyrics, so decide for yourself.

CHORUS
Shalai Lai Lai Halilili Hai Lo!
Hi Li Ba Lai Hey Hi Li Bai Lo!
We gettin' Arab money!
We gettin' Arab money!
Ha La Shiki Hai Lili Ba La!
Milli Ai Lai Shi Lili Ba La!
We gettin' Arab money!
We gettin' Arab money!

Now, there ain't no way that you could kill the beast dead
I got Middle East women and Middle East bread
I got oil well money in the desert playing golf
Dolce shorts, dashiki with a Louis Scarf
Chest cold, diamonds make a nigga wanna cough
In Dubai, 20 million on the villa loft
And then I step up in the club and then these other niggas mad as shit
The way I make the people wanna sing the hook in Arabic!

Seven star hotels, Maybach, movie sick
Big bitches, knock-kneed camel-toed groupie shit
Women walk around while security on camelback
Club on fire now, niggas don't know how to act
Sittin' in casinos while I'm gamblin' with Arafat
Money long, watch me purchase pieces of the Almanac
Y'all already know, I got the streets buzzin'
While I make you bow down and make Salaat like a Muslim

See, now I take trips to Baghdad dummy
While I use stacked chips and count Arab money now
I don't need to get fresh, about to grow a beard dude
So much cake even the money look weird too
Domestic bread, and I'm broad, I'm tryna eat right
Prince Alwali, Bin Talal, Al Saul
They respect the value of my worth in Maui, Malaysia
Iran and Iraq, Saudi Arabia!

Of course, some of these lyrics are simply stupid, silly, unrelated references to the Middle East, such the mentions of the dashiki, Arafat, the royals, Baghdad, etc. I would say that these types of irrelevant references are pretty common in hip-hop. However, there are also the things that I have highlighted in bold. These things are much more harmful to Arab identity and perceptions.

Firstly, there's the reference to oil money. The Middle East is of course known for oil, and the stereotype is that Arabs are all rich because of it. Obviously, many countries in the Middle East are not rich in oil, and even for those who are, I doubt the majority of the population is rich from it. There's also the desert and camels reference. Of course, the Middle East is portrayed as place where men ride camels in endless sand. Again, this is a misconception that the song perpetuates. The mention of Salaat and Islam is similarly detrimental in that it gives the impression that 'Arab' and 'Muslim' are synonymous, which we know to be inaccurate. Lastly, Busta Rhymes mentions growing a beard, as if all Arabs have beards.

Nice -- totally politically correct. You know what else doesn't help? The girl warbling at the end of the video! All of this, paired with the faux-Arabic chanting, is really respectful to those A-rabs, isn't it? Although according to this Wikipedia article, this remix, featuring such heavy hitters as Lil Wayne, Diddy, Akon, and T-Pain, utilizes actual Arabic:

"Bismillāhi r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm. Al ḥamdu lillāhi rabbi l-'ālamīn"
Translation: "In the name of Allah (God), most gracious most merciful. All Praise is due to Allah, Lord of the worlds.

"As-Salamu Alaykum Warahmatullah Wa Barakatu"
Translation: "Peace be upon you" (A Greeting)

"Alhamdulillah"
"Praise to Allah (God)"

"Habibi"
"My Love"

"Bismillāhi r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm"
Translation: "In the name of Allah (God), most gracious most merciful."

I suppose this is at least an improvement, although this time around, Busta does claim that he has "so much paper [he] could probably gift wrap a planet." Lyrics for this remix have not yet been posted and I don't have the ear or the energy to transcribe rap lyrics, so I can't definitively say whether or not this version is an improvement or not. :/

Standing in the kitchen of my friend's house in New Jersey, I listened to coverage of the attacks. The reporters speculated on the identity of the terrorist attackers, discussed the terrorists' suspected method of entry into Mumbai, and they rattled off the number of victims -- both those who were injured and those who were lost. But most of all, in the particular news show that I was watching -- unfortunately the network/channel escapes me now, but I think it might have been CNN -- the reporters talked about Rabbi Gavriel Noach Holtzberg and his wife, Rivkah.

What I specifically remember about the coverage of the attacks was the mention of these two people who are survived by their two year old son. This is because, as the reporter spoke of the Nariman House, the Bombay Center for Jewish Life, she took the time to speak very specifically about these two people instead of the other victims. She also paused whilst talking and began again with something along the lines of, "And we just found out now that the Holtzbergs have a connection with the U.S.," explaining that the Holtzbergs had lived in the U.S. for a period of time before they moved to Mumbai.

Why take the time to specifically point this out?

What relevance this has is arguably vague, but it is something that is mentioned in many articles that I've looked at. Some articles I've seen have even called the Holtzbergs Americans, but I've read that at least Noach is Israeli. By connecting this Jewish couple to America, the news media seems to be perpetuating the Clash of Civilizations. Jews and Christians are lumped together as 'The West' and of course pitted against the Muslims and terrorists of the East.

Yes, of course the terrorist attacks in Mumbai were aimed at tourists and, clearly because the Nariman House was hit, so were the Jewish. This makes the terrorists of course guilty of perpetuating the Clash as well. Both sides have grouped the enemy into something amorphously monolithic and oppositional.

It wasn't a place that I particularly felt either way about, but because I had so many friends who were Jewish and my impression of Jews is a good one as a result, I definitely had a more positive than negative impression of Israel. And because I wasn't, by any means, well informed on the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I never thought to side with the Palestinians instead of the Jews. Why would I when all of my friends who had an opinion on the topic sided with Israel?

Two of my best friends in high school are Jewish, and I loved them, their families, their culture, their home. One of them in particular was very outspoken on how much she loved Israel and how much she hated Palestinians. She was always a very impassioned, strong-willed, proud, and opinionated individual. The things she said about Palestinians consisted mostly of news stories relating to bombings.

My other friend was more quiet on the topic. I know she went on Birthright, but I don't really remember her ever saying very much on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This may have been because her family was "less Jewish" than the other girl's, and as a result, she felt less strongly about it. It could have also been because she was just a more secular person in general and didn't believe in all the hype about Israel (that's right -- I called it 'hype') that the liberal people in our country (especially our hometown) and in her community tended to spew. It could have also been that she didn't know much about the subject and therefore kept her mouth shut about it.

I think they're both pretty representative of the types of people in this world: those who speak of things they know little of with lots of energy and passion, so much so that they sometimes convince others to join them in their view, and those who don't speak much about what they don't know.

The first girl would be the type to react positively and excitedly to someone who said, "I love Israel" or "I love Jews." The second would be more skeptical of each statement. Of course, these tendencies are predictable to me because they are very reflective of each of their personalities, but I had never quite extended it to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict until I had learned more about the conflict. Reading Joe Sacco's Palestine, especially, really opened my eyes to many things I had been blind to in the past.

Israelis' treatment of Palestinians seems to be just as bad as the treatment of Israelis by Palestinians that I always seem to hear about from the news or from my Jewish friends. The idea that these people were exiled from their homes, their entire country deleted, their rights thrown out the window really shocks me. When I all hear is how Palestinians mistreated Israelis, it surprises me to hear how badly the treatment is vice versa as well. And not only that, I am surprised to find that I see where the Palestinians are coming from and why they feel the way they do.

As a result, when I go to my friend's apartment and see his Israeli flag hanging on the wall of his bedroom, I feel uneasy but I don't say a word. Although I have many friends who are Jews and I love their culture, for some of them, their love of Israel makes me wildly uncomfortable. I know that I am not in their shoes and can never see from their point of view, so I don't talk to them about it (as it is most definitely a touchy subject) but as a semi-informed bystander, I am not entirely supportive of Israel as a nation, at least the way the situation is now.

Megan is completely disgusted with the youth of America. Brace yourselves you idiots, you've made a HUGE mistake... 11:17pm
- 22 Comments

Whitney at 11:18pm November 4
Megan. You're an idiot.

Megan at 11:19pm November 4
whatever if I am now I can call yall idiots since yall have been doing that to me all day....

Whitney at 11:23pm November 4
Dude. Have you even researched McCain's policies? How he's flip-flopped, his character, the consequences of his campain plans, the cost it would do to our economy, how student rates would go up or anything? And, by the way, you CAN support the troops and be pro the troops by voting for Obama.

Megan at 11:25pm November 4
whatever I am more worried about my husband and my future with the military since we are doing 20 years

Whitney at 11:33pm November 4
So. Wouldn't you want to support troop withdrawl? Which is something Obama has consistently supported and actually has a plan for?

Whitney at 11:35pm November 4
And, of course it's going to take a long time to do so, but the point is, now we have a President who wants to work to support our troops and now we have a Congress full of like-minded people which will help make it easier to withdraw our troops safely

Whitney at 11:36pm November 4
I hope you have a healthy boy too, and I hope that he'll be able to afford college and go to a good school, which, by the way Obama will help achieve since he'll increase funding for our schools.

Megan at 11:37pm November 4
no I don't not want troop withdraw you know nothing of whats going on there the media is completely liberalized and is very biased...we need to be there is a necessity or the middle east will be devastated again....But Obama will not get troop withdraw anytime soon its a fact...it will take years and years if he does try it

Megan at 11:39pm November 4
if you really knew why we were over there you might have a different view but its just not the best idea

Megan at 11:40pm November 4
yea hell increase spending so we will go into more of a depression and maybe my kid won't have to worry about schooling we have the GI bill for that!

Whitney at 11:43pm November 4
Of course it's going to be a long and complicated process!! I have no illusions about that. I realize I don't know first hand what's going on out there, but I do know a number of troops who are excited at the idea of Obama as President, and who want our country to be respected once again, and not just a country full of greedy war-hawks who are only looking to line their pockets at the expense of the entire country. I realize we're not going to agree, but I urge you to fully research the country's policies and the underlying reasons for the past few years' policies. You would be surprised.

Whitney at 11:45pm November 4
Dude. Talk about increasing spending. You do know that the war is costing us $10 billion every month right? And a lot of the spending isn't even going towards the troops' welfare, safety or anything. There's a lot of funding that is going toward buiding projects that no one in the military wants, nor needs and is only being built because of pork-barrel agreements. And this is something I got first-hand from a head contract negotiator for the Navy, and is also the President of the San Diego Chapter of Veteren's For Peace.

Megan at 11:47pm November 4
we are not over there for wealth whitney its about protecting the government in the middle east you talk to the troops over there and find out why we are really there thats where civilians don't get it we are not there for oil anymore we are there trying to fix their government and if we leave it will go back to the way it was and everything will go to waste....do you really want a man who won't say the pledge of allegiance or touch the american flag or where the flag pin unless they are hounded about it being your president?

Whitney at 11:48pm November 4
By the way, I'm also an auxillary member of Veteran's for Peace, have volunteered a lot for them and protested a lot with them and I have heard first-hand from a lot of current military members that they support Obama and his policies. And, also, you do know that over 40 Generals support Obama too right? Let me repeat that. These Generals know full well the consequences and and what is happening first hand regarding the war.

Megan at 11:48pm November 4
I think we need to get down on that but yanno wait until he redistributes the wealth to mostly people on welfare when your working your ass off to get a good job and you get less than someone on welfare

Megan at 11:50pm November 4
whatever I am tired talking about all this it can keep going and this is putting too much stress on my baby so night...its done and over with so whatever...

Whitney at 11:53pm November 4
Megan. He is going to tax people who make more than $250,000 to use on re-enforcing the infrastructure of our government. This includes spending money on fixing our schools, which will encourage growth in Information Technology and create more jobs, create more opportunities for the working poor as well as the unemployed, and he will increase our stature in the world-view which will in turn allow us to keep ahold of our ability to affect global politics and the global economy. There's a lot more to it than you think.

To begin with, this is especially interesting to me because this is actually someone I used to know from my very liberal hometown of San Mateo, California. Someone from Northern California is actually pro-McCain, pro-Republican, and pro-war in Iraq. But I mean, Megan was always kind of an odd one, so I’m not exactly shocked out of my mind.

This is also interesting to me, of course, because her arguments very closely mirror what a lot of people in Middle America must very strongly believe. She truly believes that “we” NEED to be there for the good of the Middle East and that the liberal media has tricked us into thinking the U.S. government’s interest in the Middle East is selfish and unwarranted.

She says that we are not there for “wealth,” but “protecting the government in the Middle East,” that we are there “trying to fix their government.” Of course, it never occurs to her that perhaps the Middle East should fix their own government, assuming that the entire Middle East has only one single government and that it needs fixing, as defined by Western standards of “successful” government. Without us, they would be “devastated.”

Her arguments are refuted by her friend Whitney, who is much more representative of the liberal political attitudes of our hometown. She calls the U.S. “a country full of greedy war-hawks who are only looking to line their pockets at the expense of the entire country,” which obviously Megan disagrees with, saying we’re “not there for oil anymore.”

Of course, if she had read Salam Pax’s blog, she would see that the people of the Middle East do not want American soldiers there, do not want a war, do not want outside involvement. They see America’s foreign policy as invasive, and they don’t want the modern extension of colonialism, imperialism, to touch their homelands.

Salam Pax says in his blog, “I will still see the very probable war as part of the USA’s on-going process to impose it’s control abroad… Look at what the American government is doing thru non-American eyes and you’ll see a different picture. It is not only Iraq, but foreign policy in general.”

He doesn’t want us there because he loves his country and the people in it, and “there is no way you can convince me that a war is OK.” If we were in his shoes, wouldn’t we feel the same way too? My friend watched Control Room with me, and what she kept on repeating as we watched the film was, “I would hate us.” If, had fate ordained it, we were in the situation that the Middle East is in right now, we would hate us as well, and we would not want war or help or imperialism. I hope this is something Megan will realize.

Well, that's sort of beside the point. What I'm really comparing between the two are the reactions from the ultra-religious. We talked a little bit in class about the reactions of very conservative Muslims to "The 99." The consensus seemed to be that the religious zealots of the Middle East didn't like "The 99" because faith has to be put into Allah and not into the fictional superheroes like those in "The 99." It takes away from Allah's greatness. Also, it is considered blasphemous to portray Allah, and the characters of "The 99" are depictions of Allah's 99 characteristics and names.

Something we didn't talk about was Christianity's reaction to Harry Potter. What made me think of this was my friend Melinda's mother. Melinda's family is Christian, and they were all sent to private Christian schools when they were younger. (Melinda actually didn't even know what a dreidel was until I told her during our junior year of high school.) Her younger sister is about 14 right now, and their mother has banned her from reading Harry Potter since she was about 10.

The reactions from conservative Christians in America have been as hostile towards the Harry Potter series as the Muslim reaction towards "The 99." Many see Harry Potter as unsuitable reading material for their children because of the depictions of sorcery and witchcraft. In fact, according to About.com, "Harry Potter books topped the list of most challenged books for four years in a row: 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002." Christians have argued that the series is about witchcraft, and "witchcraft is an abomination to God," that it "openly promotes Satanism," that is a "part of a Satanic plot," and "clearly demonic in nature" because it "presents occult practices as being normative and good" (source).

It's interesting to compare the two. Both incited strong reactions within the religious right as being blasphemous and unholy. Both are very popular with children. Both also feature characters with supernatural capabilities that become heroes. It is telling that these pieces of fiction are geared towards children and basically feature superheroes (One could perhaps argue that Harry Potter isn't exactly a superhero, but he definitely serves as someone who saves the world from evil, which is enough for me to lump him in the 'superhero' category.) Looking into these two tips, it can easily be seen that the religious right is attempting to protect the young and impressionable of their groups from being corrupted by fiction that they see as harmful and blasphemous, although their views of what is harmful is intensely skewed, in my opinion.

Of course, the Harry Potter series has also caused outrage in the Christian community with J.K. Rowling's outing of the beloved headmaster, Dumbledore. To me, that almost makes more sense than all the talk about Satanic plots and abominations of God.

In Persepolis, Marjane Satrapi writes an autobiographical, graphic novel account of her childhood in Iran and her experience moving to Poland as a teenager. A moving account of a confusing and war-riddled childhood, Satrapi’s story depicts views that are both Orientalist and Clashist. To begin with, Satrapi’s parents send her to Poland, a European, Western country where they know that she will not be persecuted for her rebellious beliefs and strong (and very verbal) opinions. This decision by them illustrates both their faith in the West for being liberal, progressive, and open-minded and their lack of faith in the Middle East for having the same qualities. It is also telling that, while still in Iran, Satrapi attends a private French school where she is taught how to speak a Western language. This decision also falls into the category of being Orientalist, due to the belief in Western superiority in education. Satrapi’s father also states that he does not believe anything on the news unless the BBC airs it, corroborating the idea that the West is the authority to believe and trust, while the Middle East’s media sources are unreliable. Iran is also depicted as a place full of religious fanatics, where Guardians of the Revolution roam the streets and police citizens fervently.

However, not all of Satrapi’s Orientalist views are positive; her depiction of her life in Poland leaves much to be desired. For instance, Satrapi is exposed to sex and drugs for the first time while she is there. She also sees the materialism and racism of her peers in addition to the lack of community there, which results in a brief period of homelessness. All of these depictions of the West are Clashist, showing the West to be the secular, immoral place that many stereotypically see it as, oppositional to Iran and the Middle East yet irresistible in its appeal.

In many ways, though, Persepolis does not pander to Orientalism. In Satrapi’s story, many different kinds of Iranians are seen, not simply the religious zealots typically portrayed in media; there are socialists, communists, and liberals, and students who condemn her for using birth control as well as school administrators who let her slip by despite her incendiary behavior. As a result, Iran is not seen as a monolithic block without variation and complexities. Satrapi’s parents also combat Clashist ideas by recognizing that the West is both good and bad, progressive and in a way backwards when they say that Americans are “dumb but free.”

However, it is unlikely that all parents in Iran are so nuanced in their thoughts and ideals. Satrapi’s story cannot necessarily be extended to the rest of the Iranian population. Despite the fact that many in Iran may think the same way she does – some students support her right to use birth control as well – there are also many others who do not. For every person she depicts as being liberal in Iran, there are 5 who are not. Satrapi’s first-person account does, however, allow Westerners to understand that there are those in the Middle East who are secular and therefore “progressive,” resistant to and sometimes fearful of those in their government and country who are not.

In Palestine, Joe Sacco attempts to write a graphic novel from a “Palestinian perspective,” one that opposes, in the West, the dominant Israeli view of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This conflict, he shows, is focused on territory and cruelty and not much else. His account is Orientalist in its depiction of violence and conflict. Every Palestinian he encounters has been through horrors conducted by the Israeli army – the cutting of their olive trees, the murdering of their sons and relatives, the destruction of their homes, and unlawful jailing. This account of the Middle East presents it as a place that is consistently riddled with violence and conflict, in line with Orientalism.

We must keep in mind, however, that Sacco’s account of the war is second-person, as opposed to the others we have read. Sacco did not experience these things himself but tells us the stories of others. His is not an objective view because he was seeking out sensational stories of violence and terror that would make for interesting reading. (He does not show the everyday, “normal” lives of these people, perpetuating an Orientalist stereotype that the Middle East is innately violent and will forever be so.) His is a view of a journalist disillusioned with the objectivity of journalism, looking to find truth in the nonobjective. As a result, he discovered and adopted the view of the Palestinians, siding with them. This is especially Clashist because it takes on the black-and-white vision of those who believe in the Clash. Complexities of the conflict are not shown; instead, one single side of the conflict is wrong, and the other is right.

As well as being Clashist, Palestine cannot be said to be a good indicator of the experiences of most Palestinians because of the lack of first-person experience. Joe Sacco is neither ethnically Arabic nor was he raised in the Middle East. The stories he tells are not his and therefore are not necessarily truthful or reliable. Beyond that, the lack of everyday life in his depictions of Palestine further make his book unreflective of the “true” lives of Palestinians.

An actual first-person account of a Palestinian, “Memory for Forgetfulness,” by Mamoud Darwish, better portrays the life and feelings of a Palestinian. Darwish describes Lebanon’s civil war and his experience as a Palestinian in the midst of it. His everyday life is described in great detail, especially his love of coffee and his insufferable separation from it. Darwish’s account of his experience in the war is riddled with contradictions of being Palestinian. Darwish laments of his Palestinian heritage, “[it] present[s] for inspection an identity, which, shown at borders, sounds an alarm so that contagious diseases may be kept in check, and at the same time they note how expertly this very identity is used to uplift Arab-nationalist spirit” (16). His portrayal of the civil war in Lebanon and his identity as a Palestinian is wholly anti-Clashist; his story shows us that conflict exists within the Middle East, whether it be between the religious and secular or the Lebanese and Palestinians. Thus, conflicts occur within civilizations as well, not just between them. Darwish’s account also challenges the stereotypes of war by presenting a very emotional and personal account. We can feel the pain and immobility in his story when he writes such things as this: “I feel the pain of an injury that hasn’t happened. My legs have been crushed under the rubble” (24). His account is one that focuses not on politics but not the emotional and physical destructions and tragedies of war. These feelings are more universal than politics, and therefore, I believe are more capable of being applied to the wider population of the Middle East.

Mona Hatoum’s “Measure of a Distance” video also does something similar. Emotional letters between Hatoum and her mother depict the suffering of separation as a result of war, humanizing those who are dehumanized in war. The immediate, everyday nature of the letters and the naked pictures of her mother and the sexual content in the letters are also anti-Orientalist. Instead of showing these Middle Eastern women as being repressed and backwards, they are sexually liberated and comfortable discussing sex. But in spite of this, Orientalism shows through in Hatoum’s father’s reaction to the nude photographs of her mother; he is strongly opposed to this open display of sensuality. This also happens to be a rarely seen, feminine view of the war, although that exclusivity in itself could be Orientalist, as a result of the “innate” sexism of the Middle East.

In Salam Pax’s blogs, the everyday life of a Middle Easterner in the midst of war is also described. Pax’s blogs are immediate and emotional, starkly honest throughout. The depictions of war are similar to that of Hatoum’s and Darwish’s. Pax worries about his country, Iraq, and what will become of it: “I know Saddam is a nutcase with a finger on the trigger. But this is my country and I love its people. There is no way you can convince me that a war is OK. I worry about what will happen during the attacks” (38). His commentary on everyday life prior to the war also gives context to the conflict, showing that there is life beyond violence in the Middle East, which is anti-Orientalist. His belief that Iraq was Islamist as a result of Western intervention and the Gulf War is also anti-Orientalist and anti-Clashist because his thought lacks the idea of inherent repression in the Middle East. However, Pax also gives Orientalist views when he describes how he is not a “Regular Joe.” He says of himself and his friend Raed, “We both have a mistrust of religion… And we both have mouths which have gotten us into trouble. The regular Joe would be more inclined to beat the shit out of us infidels” (27). The idea that he is “an infidel,” different from his fellow Iraqis because he is secular and verbal about his opinions, is Orientalist and Clashist. This assumes that he is Western, “just like us,” says Ian Katz, and unlike other Middle Easterners (ix). His lack of ‘regular Joe’ status also makes it difficult for readers to extrapolate his experience and apply it to other the larger picture of Iraq, although his emotional response to the war and love of his country is probably applicable to many or most Iraqis.

“The 99,” a comic strip that created by Dr. Naif Al-Mutawa of Teshkeel Comics, features superheroes based upon Allah’s 99 names or attributes from the Koran. The controversy it has caused in the Middle East is a result of the depiction of Allah in his 99 attributes, the lack of hijabs, and the transference of faith from Allah to fictional superheroes. Controversy in the West is due to fear of it inciting a rise to Islamic dominance, for the all the superhero characters are Muslim. The comic is really, very minimally Islamic and therefore not Orientalist, as no mention of Islam really occurs except in the names of the characters that are also the 99 names of Allah. It is, however, presented in a format that is a Western phenomenon – comics. This means that some who have been involved in its creation are Western, giving it less authenticity and more Orientalist tint. It is interesting in that it is the only fictional account we have read for this section, therefore, experiences cannot truly be expanded to greater Muslim or Arabic populations.

Throughout all the representations of experiences in the Middle East that we have encountered in this section, the ones that are most capable of being extrapolated and applied to a greater population, in my mind, are those that are based upon emotion. Darwish and Hatoum’s accounts seem most applicable to the wider Middle Eastern experience to me because emotions are universal. Everyone who has experienced war is hurt by it, is saddened by it, loses hope because of it. Accounts that include some political analysis but still depict the everyday lives of Middle Easterners are the next most applicable, such as the stories of Satrapi and Pax. Sacco’s is quite possibly the least universal to the Middle Eastern experience, perhaps even less so than “The 99,” simply because it is written by someone who is a foreigner and an outsider. This is because, despite the varying levels of Orientalism and Clashism within the other stories, they give first-person accounts of what it is like to experience wars and conflicts as people of those countries. Whatever they say, whether or not it can be counted as Orientalist or Clashist, is valid because it is true. As a result, they give Westerners an idea of what some of the population of the Middle East must think and believe.

I distinctly remember the nameless boy fasting for Ramadan. Even though this was in elementary school, fasting is something that embedded itself into my mind purely because I had never heard of such a thing before and had never had to do it. Being without religion, my family never participated in anything where fasting was necessary. Being Chinese, my family never believed in anything that involved abstaining from food. (My mother used to say that traditional Chinese people crossing paths with friends would always first say 'hello' and then ask if the other has eaten yet as a result of the lack of food in "the old country.")

I think I would labeled Yasmin as Arabic/Muslim just because she appeared to look ethnically "Middle Eastern." When I look back on the time that I spent with her -- we were friends and I had visited her house a few times -- I can think of no reason why I would have labeled her as a Muslim. The garb that her mother wore could have been Indian, for all I knew and for all I know now.

As for Omid, when I looked at his Facebook profile just a minute ago (Facebook -- such a handy tool, isn't it?), I can see that I was certainly wrong about him. Not only is he not Arabic, he is not a Muslim. He's Persian and Zoroastrian. Of course, I assumed he was Muslim and Arabic purely because he appeared to be, what is in my mind, Middle Eastern. Come to think of it, I think Yasmin might have been Persian as well.

Deep in the recesses of my "Western" mind, and I'm sure in the mind of most Americans, all the people in the Middle East are both Arabic and Muslim. The identity of those living in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, IRANISTAN are all the same. They're turban-wearing, beard-covered, camel-riding people shouting things about cous cous in the frenzy of a bazaar. At the same time, we don't necessarily see Egypt as part of the Middle East despite their large Muslim population. To quote "Architourism," the Egypt that many see does not "represent the reality of Islamic Egypt but a cruel Western perversion of it" (20). It is interesting what we have chosen to include in the monotholic view of Middle Easterners and what we have chosen to exclude.

Queen Rania says to her viewers, “In a world where it’s so easy to connect to one another, we still remain very much disconnected.” Of course, in this case, Queen Rania is referring to the disconnect between the Western world and the Arabic world. She claims that we should try connect with each other, as the world is a wonderful place that “we cannot appreciate with stereotypes.” She goes on to say, “If what most people know about the Arab world and Arab people they’ve known through programs like ‘24’ and Jack Bauer, I think they’re in for a very big surprise.”

What is interesting about what she says is that she, as much as possible, refers to the Arab world in ways that are indistinct. For instance, at one point in the blog, she calls it “my region.” She also refers to it as “the part of the world that I call ‘home.’” Perhaps she is endearing her viewers to this place that seems so foreign and disconnected from their lives, or perhaps she is consciously and meticulously attempting to avoid the labels of the infamous ‘civilizations’ dichotomy. Occasionally, she calls it “the Arab world.” Otherwise, she uses ownership to characterize it.

It is also interesting that she condemns the media – the popular television show “24” especially – for portraying Arabs and/or Muslims in a negative light, the same argument that Jack Shaheen made.
Another thing that is interesting about this blog is that, in contrast, she calls YouTube “a great resource” for connecting people across the globe and breaking down stereotypes. This, I presume, is because self-representation is undoubtedly more accurate than second-hand information being disseminated by other sources (which is her complaint about “24”). This brings into the equation the uncertain idea of relating individual life stories to a larger understanding of the experience of other individuals in other parts of the world. But perhaps many Muslim and Arabic YouTube users will respond to Queen Rania’s blogs, giving a more complete view of their respective populations. Also, this use of media and technology is very modern for a place that is known for being backwards, so that in itself helps to break down stereotypes a little bit.

However – sorry to be nitpicky but this must be said – it would be misleading to assume that all the Muslim and Arabic people from that part of the world who are posting are an accurate representation of all people from that part of the world. Just as in America, the people who are very familiar with the internet, especially a youth-oriented, pop culture-based website like YouTube, are not representative of all the people in America. Hence even these first-hand testimonials must be taken with a grain of salt.

Said does not believe in the labels of ‘the West’ and ‘Islam.’ He believes that “neither the term Orient nor the concept of the West has any ontological stability, each is made up of human effort, partly affirmation, partly identification of the Other” (Orientalism xvii). These delineations do not exist naturally, Said is saying. They are man-made, the borders man-drawn. He goes further, asking us to look into these terms to understand why the opposition of Islam is never Christianity, but instead, the West: “‘The West’ is greater than and has surpassed the stage of Christianity, its principle religion, the world of Islam… is still mired in religion, primitivity and backwardness… [It] is no more than ‘Islam,’ reducible to a small number of unchanging characteristics” (Covering 11). Contrary to Bernard Lewis’ Clash, Said’s view postures that ‘the West’ and ‘Islam’ are artificial terms with meanings and connotations that men have created. Instead of history being an objective truth where two “civilizations” hurtle towards each other on a crash course to destruction, Said believes that those in power have created history according to their desires.

In bending the truth and creating history, ‘the West’ has the upper hand: “The relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony” (Said, Orientalism 5). Despite attempts of Western political scientists and even historians and scholars to understand the Orient, their views are unavoidably biased; this makes sense, as there is no “method for detaching the scholar from the circumstances of life” (Said, Orientalism 10). However objective they may attempt to be, and however objective we may assume them to be, their opinions are, unfortunately, subjective. Even in academic circles, which are the expected to be the most impartial, scholars still write and research “according to standards, conventions, and expectations shaped by his or her peers, not by the Muslims being studied” (Said, Covering 19). This is because “political imperialism governs an entire field of study, imagination, and scholarly institutions – in such a way as to make its avoidance an intellectual and historical impossibility” (Said, Orientalism 14). As a result, the thought of Westerners cannot escape the influence that imperialistic, Orientalist ideas have pressed upon us. Academics research Islam using the established conventions, feeding into governmental public policy that denigrates Islam, while media misrepresents Muslims and the public views them as the Other. All these things feed into one another, creating a perpetual cycle from which Islam cannot escape.

Why do this? One great reason for Orientalism is that war would not be possible without “a well-organized sense that these people over there were not like ‘us’ and didn’t appreciate ‘our’ values” (Said, Orientalism xvii). How can they when they are our opposites? To the West, the Orient represents our “contrasting image, idea, personality” (Orientalism xxii, 2). In serving the political agenda of the West, it is necessary to create a “belligerent collective identity” for Muslims that is innately different and diametrically opposed to us (Said, Orientalism xxii). If Muslims were not portrayed in such a way (such a way being that of the Other, that of religion, primitivity and backwardness), the atrocities of war would not be justifiable. Said says, “In the demonization of an unknown enemy, for whom the label ‘terrorist’ serves the general purpose of keeping people stirred up and angry, media images command too much attention and can be exploited at times of crisis and insecurity” (Orientalism xxvi). Through this organized science of portraying the Orient as fundamentalist terrorists in the media, the West controls the view of its citizens, demanding that they see the Orient colored with sinister intent and wild religious zeal. This way, they ensure that there will always be support for the war.

However, I would be remiss not to point out that, as strong an argument as Orientalism is, it gives too much power to media influence and too little power to audience agency. Jack Shaheen, too, argues that the American film industry “has used repetition as a teaching tool, tutoring movie audiences by repeating over and over, in film after film, insidious images of Arab people,” that these “slanderous stereotypes have affected honest discourse and public policy” (Shaheen 172). But this assumes that there are predetermined media meanings and interpretations to media, that media simply impart knowledge onto the audience. Is it no longer true that audiences have the agency and ability to create meanings for themselves? In addition, it is not only Arabs who are represented in a negative light; other minorities are also shown in a less-than-flattering manner. It could easily be argued that Native Americans, Asians, Blacks were once and are still depicted in such ways, albeit maybe less so than Arabs at present because of the current conflict between the West and Islam. In any case, the treatment of Arabs by the media is not particular or specific to Arabs.

Similarly, Said complains that the news media perpetuates stereotypes of Islam, that “instead of trying to find out more about the country, the reporter takes hold of what is nearest at hand, usually a cliché or some bit of journalistic wisdom that the readers at home are unlikely to challenge” (Said, Covering lii). This, however, is not something unique to Islam; the nature of news media requires that reporters produce news quickly and efficiently, no matter which country or people are being covered. This unfortunately means that reporters cannot spend an inordinate amount of time researching their topics in depth. Said also protests the fact that “Islam has entered the consciousness of most Americans… because it has been connected to newsworthy issues like oil, Iran and Afghanistan, or terrorism” (Said, Covering 16). Again, this cannot necessarily blamed on the relationship between the Occident and the Orient; the rules of news media dictate that newsworthy issues are those that are covered. Any region around the world is covered by Western news media in a similar manner: the terrible, the horrible, the sensational – in short, the newsworthy – events are the ones which are reported.

Despite the strength given to the media and the weakness assumed upon its audiences, Said’s argument for Orientalism is strong. Instead of falling into the trap of the binary Clash of Civilizations in which two always-opposite cultures come to an inevitable collision, Said analyzes the ideas of objectivity, authority, and power in relation to the connections between the West and Islam. History’s objectivity is questioned, as it should be, and its faults and biases revealed. But at the same time that Said counters the Clash with a more complex understanding of the hegemonic relationship between the two “civilizations,” he continues an idea of the Clash, the idea that the two are still poised to conflict. Although ancient histories may not be involved and diametric opposition is negated, the Occident and the Orient are still enemies at odds.

Ahmed views the clash as the result of the West being individualistic and energetic, dominating with consumerism and media, while Islam is focused on patience and balance, not the speed that is essential to the postmodern age (47). Because of this, Islam sees Western culture as offensive, invasive, and unfortunately, irresistible (Ahmed 48). Western media forcefully destroys the values that Islam holds dear – family structures, authority, and balance; “whereas a century ago, Muslims could retreat so as to maintain the integrity of their lives, their areas are now penetrated; technological advances have made escape impossible” (Ahmed 59). In addition, Ahmed complains that Western portrayal of Muslims is negative (56). Ahmed’s argument, however easy it may be to believe, wholeheartedly ignores the fact that media is a choice. People choose to consume media. Media consumers also create their own interpretations; media consumption is not a one-way street where knowledge is transferred from the producers of media into the consumers of media. Also, the problems that Ahmed writes of are not unique to Islam. Many minorities and foreign groups have been represented negatively in American media. As well, many other “civilizations” face the same problem Islam does, that of resisting assimilation and conformity to Western ideals and beliefs.

Lewis attributes the clash to the jealousy and humiliation of proud Muslims, as a result of their decline and a result of invasion of Western ways, including their unsuccessful imitations of Western political institutions (59). And because America is the leader of the West, Lewis asserts, “the United States has inherited… the pent-up hate and anger” (60). Therefore, democracy, capitalism, and American culture and media, in addition to America’s support for Israel, are all sources of conflict. One example he uses to support his argument is the attack of the USIS center in Islamabad as a result of Salman Rushdie’s book publication in the U.S., despite its earlier publication in England (60). He claims that the root of this incident is unrelated to the U.S., and therefore, it is obvious that “we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and governments that pursue them” (60).

Mahmoud Mamdani, however, would beg to differ. Mamdani states that “political Islam was born in the colonial period” and created in interaction with the West (14). Hence, the conflicts between the two do not stem from ancient and long running feuds but, rather, can be traced to the not so distant past, a past of colonialism. To disregard colonialism’s impact in the history of Middle Eastern countries is reductionist, ignoring a long history of imperial rule and boiling legitimate anger down to cultural and religious differences. Lewis’ theories blatantly ignore the impacts and effects of capitalism and the Cold War on the people and nations of the Islamic world. When colonialism and imperialism have plagued Islam for so long, it is not irrational that some Muslims have reacted negatively to the United States, a country that still keeps what many would consider an imperialistic hold on the Middle East through its support of Israel. Lewis’ argument is also ahistorical in that sense; “Lewis treats what is actually a series of different historical encounters… as if they were hallmarks of a single clash of civilizations over fourteen hundred years. Rather than recognize that each encounter was fueled by a specific political project” (Mamdani 26). In this view, then, history is also static and unchanging, deviating from the actual reality of the past, where identities and alliances are capable of shifting and changing and do so regularly.

Samuel Huntington builds upon Lewis’ argument. His claim is as follows: “The source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural” (22). He defines a civilization as a “cultural entity,” including language, religion, history, and customs (23). He gives a few reasons for the cause of clashing civilizations. These include the “fact” that differences between civilizations are basic and innate and that “processes of economic modernization and social change… are separating people from longstanding local identities… and weaken[ing] the nation state as a source of identity” (26). Andrew Hammond also supports this idea, describing how “satellite channels are looking for issues that unite, not divide, and as such, their audience is not so much Egyptian, Saudi, or Jordanian as ‘Arab’” (16). Last but not least, Huntington purports that “cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones” (27). Following this logic, tensions between the West and Islam, two civilizations drastically different from one another, will undoubtedly – nay, naturally – be violent and virulent, because other civilizations do not understand “Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state (40).

“Culture Talk,” as Mamdani calls what Huntington and Lewis created, “assumes that every culture has a tangible essence that defines it, and then it explains politics as a consequence of that essence” (17). Much of Huntington’s argument depends on the idea that Muslims and Westerners have an innate core that is Muslim and Western, respectively. This view is heavily monolithic. To say that any massive group of people has some sort of intrinsic essence that differentiates said group from another group is absurd. In fact, it is racist to say that all Muslims have the same mindset and principles. Like Americans, Muslims too, come in all shapes and sizes with many different beliefs and values. It is also racist and ethnocentric to believe that equality, liberty, and democracy are Western qualities. Not only are these qualities not exclusive to the West, they are touted by the West as the apex of modernity, not by the world. Looking at the world through a Western lens means judging other societies using our own standards and values. Once distanced, the biases, as well as our normative views, become clear.

Additionally, it is also tempocentric to believe that Western culture is “farther along” or more modern than Islamic culture. Culture is undoubtedly related to modernity, with “premodern people… either slow to modernize or resistant to modernization,” in the view of clash-believers (Mamdani 18). Pasquinelli argues, however, that fundamentalism is modern. She claims that Islamic fundamentalists do not wish to return to the past; they want to make the past present and “us[e] the past to give order and meaning to the present” (14). She postures that fundamentalism is modern because it was born in the twentieth century, and “therefore, cannot help being affected by modernity even while refusing it… fundamentalism is inscribed in the area of modernity because it stakes out its borders as a paradoxical response to the lacerations determined by the modernization process” (14). The message is clear: modernity created fundamentalism. Mamdani also echoes this sentiment, saying, “Fundamentalism emerged as a struggle inside religion, not between religions, as a critique of liberal forms of religion that religious conservatives saw as accommodating an aggressive secular power” (39). Even fundamentalist practices are modern, especially in communication using media and propaganda in technologically advanced ways (Pasquinelli 15). Fundamentalism and modernity, then, are not mutually exclusive, much as the West and Islam are not entirely disparate.

Benjamin Barber sees similarities between what he calls McWorld (the West) and Jihad (Islam): “Their common thread is indifferences to civil liberty. Jihad forges communities of blood rooted in exclusion and hatred, communities that slight democracy in favor of tyrannical paternalism or consensual tribalism. McWorld forges global markets rooted in consumption and profit, leaving to an untrustworthy… invisible hand issues of public interest and common good” (7). Both are denationalizing, and neither has aims to remedy this (Barber 7). The West and Islam are not so different if each creates generalizing and sometimes deleterious bonds in its own manner, undermining democracy as we know it. Islam, then, is not a threat to democracy; both the West and Islam are threats to democracy.

It is easy to fall into the trap of believing Islam and the West are headed towards an inevitable cultural collision of epic proportions, but I believe that the truth is much more complicated than that simple, diametric opposition that Lewis and Huntington allege. While it is true that Islam rejects much of Western culture, this is not because of cultural difference so much as Islam’s “rabid response to colonialism and imperialism and their economic children, capitalism and modernity” – throwing the baby out with the bathwater, if you will (Barber 11). The roots of Muslim rage run much shallower than Lewis and Huntington impressed upon us; there are no simplistic and intrinsic hatreds and differences. Instead, there is a history of colonialism continuing into present imperialism, and there is a hegemonic belief that the Western way is the right way. There is a complex relationship between the West and Islam, one that Mamdani and Pasquinelli describe, that causes both to impinge upon and react to one another, tying and twisting one another’s truths and ways.