ABSTRACT: This report includes an analysis of the Arab television industry structure in terms of level of government ownership and funding (high) and also government control (low because of the advent of satellite). It also describes trends that Arab TV seems to be drawn towards, including call-in segments and adaptations of Western programs. It then describes some U.S. attempts to influence the Arab world through media, like Al Hurra, identifying reasons for failure and suggesting less propagandistic future media ventures along with encouragement to fuel advertising to the region to decrease government-dependence.
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
STRUCTURE OF THE ARAB TELEVISION INDUSTRY
Ownership
-Channels and Owners
-Funding
-Ownership and Control
State Control
-Range
-Satellite and Censorship
Competition
Role of Advertising
-Dependence on Government
-Lack of Advertising
CURRENT PROGRAMMATIC TRENDS
News
Interactivity
Variety
Adaptations
US INVOLVEMENT IN ARAB TELEVISION
Al Hurra
Reasons for Al Hurra’s Failure
Other Attempts
Anti-Western Propaganda?
Suggestions
-News
-Advertising
BIBLIOGRAPHY
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARAB TELEVISION INDUSTRY
Ownership
Channels and Owners:
MBC was started by Saudi businessmen, while Orbit has “close links to the Saudi royal family” (Hammond 209). In Lebanon, Future TV is partially owned by the former prime minister, Rafiq Hariri, and LBC “is controlled by a board dominated by ministers and officials close to the Syrian government” (Sakr). Meanwhile, MBC belongs to Shaikh Walid bin Ibrahim al-Ibrahim, a relative of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd and Al Jazeera is annually financed with $30 million by the Emir of Qatar (Sakr; Zayani 10).
Funding:
“Most television systems in the Arab world are subsidized by the government partly because they need a great deal of money and partly because Arab governments have a stake in the media,” such as Saudi Arabia (Zayani 14, 15).
Ownership and Control:
In the Arab world, there is a general trend of the “politicization of media ownership,” meaning “the media in general, and satellite channels in particular, operate under a patron who is either government or some rich owner who in many cases is associated, in one way or another, with the ruling elite or government (Zayani 14).
However, it would be inaccurate to claim these people promote the governments’ agendas. Someone who is has connections in the government may have self-interest in mind or business interests in addition to or instead of government agendas (Khazen).
State Control
Range:
State control of television in the Arab world varies drastically in the Arab world from what may be considered the freest of all channels, Al Jazeera – which is “not government-controlled, but is nonetheless government owned” – to state controlled channels such as Al-Iraqiya (Zayani 17).
Satellite and Censorship:
In general, satellite TV is “impossible to control” (Khazen). “By transcending borders, satellite broadcasts are technically capable of circumventing national controls. Several channels serving Middle Eastern audiences are based outside the region,” such as previously London-based MBC (Sakr).
However, some countries have been slow to relinquish control; there are “twenty-seven Egyptian terrestrial and satellite channels in total, almost all of them fully government-owned” (Hammond 214).
This is no surprise, as historically in the Arab world, media was government controlled prior to independently owned Arab satellite stations and spewed propaganda, such as what Nasser and the PLO sanctioned, leaving people to turn to CNN, BBC World and Voice of America for information on the world” (Hammond 208; Heemsbergen 1).
Competition
The Arab world is frequently described as “media congested” (Zayani 26). There are around three hundred satellite channels, encompassing a wide range of subjects, but “few of them are professional in terms of content management and audience retention” (Hammond 216).
As well, “this proliferation of satellites has made it possible for smaller operators to compete with propaganda-manufacturing oil lobbies and it has reduced the latter’s revenues by fragmenting audiences” (Mernissi).
Role of Advertising
Media outlets rely on advertising. Advertising depends on viewer numbers. However, because “advertising is tied to political considerations and succumbs to outside pressures,” advertising can be hard to procure in Arab media (Zayani 15).
Dependence on Government:
Al Jazeera survived its first few years without airing commercials consistently (Zayani 15). This, no doubt, is due to funding by the Emir of Qatar. “It is the case that some kind of subsidies, whether by state or by individuals, will continue to be necessary to the survival of much of the Arab media” (Khazen).
Lack of Advertising:
Advertising would free the Arab media from state control, but advertising expenditure is low in the Arab world compared to Western and Israeli standards (Khazen). “In global terms, Arab advertising revenue is tiny--only about a third of 1 percent of that of the world media” (Khazen).
CURRENT PROGRAMMATIC TRENDS
News
The Second Gulf War was important to the development of Arab TV broadcasting. CNN, especially, with its 24-hour news coverage, had a great effect. It became an important information outlet, “providing alternative news coverage which changed media practices and audiences’ expectations.” (Zayani 29).
CNN “gave people in the Arab world and beyond a sense of how powerful the media can be, galvanized the development of Arab satellite broadcasting” (Zayani 30). After that, Arab channels replaced the Western channels, supplying them with “more reliable news, uncensored credible information and better programs than those offered by the heavily regulated state media” (Zayani 30).
This powerful drive for news was new to the Arab world. Some conjecture that this was a result of “westernization or globalization,” that the Arab media was becoming “linked through flows of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and force” to Western media (Heemsbergen 2, 3). This is undeniable, as the obvious effect that CNN had during this time was great, instilling in the Arab people a thirst “for live, unedited and uncensored news during times when state media have fed them stale news” (Zayani 29).
Proof of this can be seen in viewers’ abandonment of MBC for Al Jazeera. Mernissi claims, “MBC’s systematic censorship was projected through the superficiality of its entertainment programs, alienat[ed] viewers… violated citizens’ right to information and reduced talk shows with intellectuals to pitiful masquerades” (Mernissi). Thus, viewers preferred Al Jazeera.
Al Jazeera also “accelerated the institutionalization of new trends in programming… nudging competitors toward live interviews… pushing some channels to display a new savvy for finding stories,” even forcing state media to conform a bit (Zayani 6).
Interactivity
Al Jazeera also initiated the trend of interactivity with its groundbreaking “talk shows with viewer call-ins” (Zayani 6). Because of the call-ins, “Arab viewers are no longer seen as consumers in a one-way communication stream” (Zayani 6). They are capable of debating live on air with politicians and experts.
This is revolutionary because “the kind of debate championed by Al Jazeera is something new in the Arab world where public political debate is considered subversive” (Zayani 6).
But instead, now“all media lobbies… who used to scorn Arab citizens and club them with one-sided propaganda, are now shifting to interactive programming to please viewers” (Mernissi).
Variety
Television seems to be following the “trends of openness and democratization in the Arab world” (Zayani 33). This is partially because “the fact that satellite television is bound, by virtue of its audience of millions of viewers, to compete for market share, forces channels, even the overwhelmingly religious ones to provide for a space for alternative spaces to emerge” (Echchaibi 2).
There is the conservative – “Aylit al-Hagg Metwalli,” a drama about a “patriarchal Cairo clothes merchant who marries an Islamically sanctioned four wives (Hammond 234). There is the middle range of New Age Islam programs – like on Islamic channel Al-Resalah – “modeled after American televangelism and religious entertainment… a simpler, more moderate message that rebukes radicalism and makes religion cool” (Echchaibi 2). And there is also the racy -- Lebanon’s “Carla-la-la,” an example of “pop video channels featuring Arab women in scanty attire” (Hammond 232).
In Syria, there is “‘Buqat daw’ (‘Spotlight’), a comedy series produced, directed, and acted by a group of young actors criticizing corruption, the role of intelligence services in clamping down on freedoms” (Hammond 233). This was unheard of Syria before 2000; “observers reckon the authorities felt it was time to allow some margin of criticism, or a release valve, as economic and political pressures in society increase (Hammond 234).
Adaptations
These, such as copies of “Star Academy,” “Big Brother,” “Who Wants to be a Millionaire?” are popular in the Arab world (Hammond 223). There are also indirect adaptations, such as “The Opposite Direction,” which is based on CNN’s “Crossfire” and “Kalam Nawa’em,” which is based on “The View” (Kraidy 48)
This is reflective of globalization; “co-productions and format adaptations reflect a ‘growing synchronization of the Arab television sector with the global television industry’” (Kraidy 48). This is also due to the lack of state revenues for media production. “These economic factors militates against the commissioning of challenging documentaries or innovative dramas, and means that broadcasters will instead rely on readymade material or imports” (Sakr).
US INVOLVEMENT IN ARAB TELEVISION
Al Hurra
Al Hurra, meaning “the free one,” was launched in 2002 as an alternative to Al Jazeera with aims to provide “accurate, balanced and objective news” and direct access to U.S. policies, but it began immediately as “a mouthpiece of the U.S. government” (Pintak 260, 258).
The channel was clearly propagandistic, and disappointed viewers, e.g., when the “leader of Hamas, Sheikh Amhed Yassin, was assassinated by the Israelis… Al Jazeera, al-Arabia and other Arab satellite channels carried the funeral live. Al-Hurra broadcast a cooking show” (Pintak 259, 260).
According to the Arab Advisors Group, “only 16 per cent of Saudi, 4.6 per cent of Egyptian and 1.3 per cent of Jordanian satellite viewers said they watched al-Hurra, versus the 71 to 88 per cent responses drawn by al-Jazeera” (Pintak 263). Obviously, Al Hurra failed in gaining support for the U.S. and in obtaining an audience.
Reasons for Al Hurra’s Failure
“The rationale behind Al Hurra is based on two erroneous assumptions: that satellite networks are responsible for the anti-Americanism in the Arab world and that once America is more clearly heard, it will be more appreciated” (Zayani 26).
On the opposite end of Al Hurra, “Al-Jazeera’s popularity stemmed directly from the fact that, in a region where the media had always been government controlled, it was largely independent” (Pintak 258). The idea that another government-controlled channel – regardless of it being the U.S. government this time – could capture Arab audiences was plainly misguided.
Other Attempts
American attacks on Al Jazeera, including the bombing of Al Jazeera’s Baghdad bureau and the ousting of Al Jazeera’s New York correspondent from the New York Stock Exchange were failed attempts at controlling Middle Eastern media as well. These attempts seemed only to galvanize Middle Eastern viewers by confirming their suspicions of America’s hypocrisy when it came to free speech and made Al Jazeera more popular in the process (Pintak 163).
The “Shared Values” campaign with “mini-documentaries” about Muslim life in America produced by advertising executives was a failure as well, with critics dismissing it as
“good news propaganda” (Pintak 270).
Anti-Western Propaganda?
Critics are wary of Al Jazeera, the supposed most widely watched and independent news channel in the Arab world (Zayani 6). Some believe that Al Jazeera is “a mouthpiece of Islamic fundamentalists” (Zayani 23). A 2002 Gallup poll also found that “objectivity is perceived as the network’s weakest area,” despite being high in objectivity compared to other networks of the region (Zayani 17).
This means that Al Jazeera is lacking in objectivity and also that other channels are further subjective. However, it is difficult to quantify objectivity. Realistically, “to what extent [can] one can be truly objective when reporting from the Arab world about issues that matter to Arabs the most”? (Zayani 18).
However, a comparison on the effects of CNN International and the BBC versus al-Jazeera found that “for both types of networks, increasing levels of attention to coverage of the U.S. leads to stronger anti-American attitudes’” (Pintak 261). This, then, illustrates the anti-American policy attitude, not a journalistic bias on the part of Al Jazeera.
Suggestions
Continuing with channels such as Al Hurra and campaigns such as “Shared Values”
would be misguided. These clearly propagandistic and reality-obscuring media ventures do not capture Arab audiences or boost their perceptions of U.S. policies. They damage the integrity of the U.S. and continue to promote the U.S. as an oppressive propaganda peddler.
News:
Al Jazeera is respected for its “commitment to daring live unedited news as well as its tendency to broadcast uncut, live pictures,” meaning no censorship or screening (Zayani 5). If the U.S. is to produce another news channel, it would have to match up to the standards that Al Jazeera has set in order to be successful, including the unedited rawness and possibly the interactivity in formatting as well, allowing those who disagree to air their opinions.
It would also have to break news before Al Jazeera, giving the U.S. an “opportunity to frame the story” for Arab viewers, which it failed to do in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s capture (Pintak 280).
In order to guarantee this news channel’s integrity, it should be aired, and be capable of being aired in the U.S. (not in violation of Smith-Mundt Act), assuring that it would be free of propaganda.
Advertising:
Another way to indirectly affect Arab media is through advertising. “In the Middle East advertising remains woefully underdeveloped” (Sakr). Advertising has increased, but “future growth is not assured” (Sakr). This is partially because there are no reliable viewing figures for advertisers to base their media purchases on; “ratings in most countries compiled by unsophisticated methods, leaving analysts skeptical about their accuracy” (Sakr).
The U.S. can encourage companies at home and abroad to advertise in the Arab world in the aims of driving up advertising expenditure and therefore decreasing media outlets’ dependency on government funding. The U.S. can also provide reliable methods to determine viewing figures, ratings, and audience tracking for Arab TV, offering advertisers more assurance in their investments and encourage advertising spending.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Heemsbergen, Luke. "Middle East Media and Knowledge Creation." Quest Journal, University of Belfast, 2007.
Khazen, Jihad. "Censorship and State Control of the Press in the Arab World." The Harvard International Journal of Press Politics 4.3 (1999) 87-92
Sakr, Naomi. "Reform or Reaction: Dilemmas of Economic Development in the Middle East." PublicationNo. 210. Middle East Report. 1999. 6 Dec. 2008