Paper 1
The so-called ‘clash of civilizations’ that is occurring presently between the West and Islam is, at first glance, a convincing argument that I am sure many Americans believe. The explanation is simple and easy to understand; nothing could be less complicated than a black-and-white theory that describes the West as progressive and the Middle East as violent, bitter, and resistant. Akbar Ahmed states that the West is exploding “through its domination of the media to expand its cultural boundaries to encompass the world,” while only Islam opposes it, “poised both to implode and explode, offer[ing] a global perspective with a potential alternative role to the world stage” (46). Bernard Lewis states simply, that in the view of Islam, “the world and all mankind are divided into two: the House of Islam, where the Muslim law and faith prevail, and the rest… which it is the duty of Muslims ultimately to bring to Islam” (49). This sets up a classic dichotomy with the West on one side of the spectrum and Islam on the other. Such discord between the two worlds is ancient, according to Lewis: “Muslims from an early date recognized a genuine rival – a competing world religion, a distinctive civilization inspired by that religion, and an empire that… was no less ambitious” (49). Because of this, these two worlds have been clashing for fourteen centuries (Lewis 49).
Ahmed views the clash as the result of the West being individualistic and energetic, dominating with consumerism and media, while Islam is focused on patience and balance, not the speed that is essential to the postmodern age (47). Because of this, Islam sees Western culture as offensive, invasive, and unfortunately, irresistible (Ahmed 48). Western media forcefully destroys the values that Islam holds dear – family structures, authority, and balance; “whereas a century ago, Muslims could retreat so as to maintain the integrity of their lives, their areas are now penetrated; technological advances have made escape impossible” (Ahmed 59). In addition, Ahmed complains that Western portrayal of Muslims is negative (56). Ahmed’s argument, however easy it may be to believe, wholeheartedly ignores the fact that media is a choice. People choose to consume media. Media consumers also create their own interpretations; media consumption is not a one-way street where knowledge is transferred from the producers of media into the consumers of media. Also, the problems that Ahmed writes of are not unique to Islam. Many minorities and foreign groups have been represented negatively in American media. As well, many other “civilizations” face the same problem Islam does, that of resisting assimilation and conformity to Western ideals and beliefs.
Lewis attributes the clash to the jealousy and humiliation of proud Muslims, as a result of their decline and a result of invasion of Western ways, including their unsuccessful imitations of Western political institutions (59). And because America is the leader of the West, Lewis asserts, “the United States has inherited… the pent-up hate and anger” (60). Therefore, democracy, capitalism, and American culture and media, in addition to America’s support for Israel, are all sources of conflict. One example he uses to support his argument is the attack of the USIS center in Islamabad as a result of Salman Rushdie’s book publication in the U.S., despite its earlier publication in England (60). He claims that the root of this incident is unrelated to the U.S., and therefore, it is obvious that “we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and governments that pursue them” (60).
Mahmoud Mamdani, however, would beg to differ. Mamdani states that “political Islam was born in the colonial period” and created in interaction with the West (14). Hence, the conflicts between the two do not stem from ancient and long running feuds but, rather, can be traced to the not so distant past, a past of colonialism. To disregard colonialism’s impact in the history of Middle Eastern countries is reductionist, ignoring a long history of imperial rule and boiling legitimate anger down to cultural and religious differences. Lewis’ theories blatantly ignore the impacts and effects of capitalism and the Cold War on the people and nations of the Islamic world. When colonialism and imperialism have plagued Islam for so long, it is not irrational that some Muslims have reacted negatively to the United States, a country that still keeps what many would consider an imperialistic hold on the Middle East through its support of Israel. Lewis’ argument is also ahistorical in that sense; “Lewis treats what is actually a series of different historical encounters… as if they were hallmarks of a single clash of civilizations over fourteen hundred years. Rather than recognize that each encounter was fueled by a specific political project” (Mamdani 26). In this view, then, history is also static and unchanging, deviating from the actual reality of the past, where identities and alliances are capable of shifting and changing and do so regularly.
Samuel Huntington builds upon Lewis’ argument. His claim is as follows: “The source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural” (22). He defines a civilization as a “cultural entity,” including language, religion, history, and customs (23). He gives a few reasons for the cause of clashing civilizations. These include the “fact” that differences between civilizations are basic and innate and that “processes of economic modernization and social change… are separating people from longstanding local identities… and weaken[ing] the nation state as a source of identity” (26). Andrew Hammond also supports this idea, describing how “satellite channels are looking for issues that unite, not divide, and as such, their audience is not so much Egyptian, Saudi, or Jordanian as ‘Arab’” (16). Last but not least, Huntington purports that “cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones” (27). Following this logic, tensions between the West and Islam, two civilizations drastically different from one another, will undoubtedly – nay, naturally – be violent and virulent, because other civilizations do not understand “Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state (40).
“Culture Talk,” as Mamdani calls what Huntington and Lewis created, “assumes that every culture has a tangible essence that defines it, and then it explains politics as a consequence of that essence” (17). Much of Huntington’s argument depends on the idea that Muslims and Westerners have an innate core that is Muslim and Western, respectively. This view is heavily monolithic. To say that any massive group of people has some sort of intrinsic essence that differentiates said group from another group is absurd. In fact, it is racist to say that all Muslims have the same mindset and principles. Like Americans, Muslims too, come in all shapes and sizes with many different beliefs and values. It is also racist and ethnocentric to believe that equality, liberty, and democracy are Western qualities. Not only are these qualities not exclusive to the West, they are touted by the West as the apex of modernity, not by the world. Looking at the world through a Western lens means judging other societies using our own standards and values. Once distanced, the biases, as well as our normative views, become clear.
Additionally, it is also tempocentric to believe that Western culture is “farther along” or more modern than Islamic culture. Culture is undoubtedly related to modernity, with “premodern people… either slow to modernize or resistant to modernization,” in the view of clash-believers (Mamdani 18). Pasquinelli argues, however, that fundamentalism is modern. She claims that Islamic fundamentalists do not wish to return to the past; they want to make the past present and “us[e] the past to give order and meaning to the present” (14). She postures that fundamentalism is modern because it was born in the twentieth century, and “therefore, cannot help being affected by modernity even while refusing it… fundamentalism is inscribed in the area of modernity because it stakes out its borders as a paradoxical response to the lacerations determined by the modernization process” (14). The message is clear: modernity created fundamentalism. Mamdani also echoes this sentiment, saying, “Fundamentalism emerged as a struggle inside religion, not between religions, as a critique of liberal forms of religion that religious conservatives saw as accommodating an aggressive secular power” (39). Even fundamentalist practices are modern, especially in communication using media and propaganda in technologically advanced ways (Pasquinelli 15). Fundamentalism and modernity, then, are not mutually exclusive, much as the West and Islam are not entirely disparate.
Benjamin Barber sees similarities between what he calls McWorld (the West) and Jihad (Islam): “Their common thread is indifferences to civil liberty. Jihad forges communities of blood rooted in exclusion and hatred, communities that slight democracy in favor of tyrannical paternalism or consensual tribalism. McWorld forges global markets rooted in consumption and profit, leaving to an untrustworthy… invisible hand issues of public interest and common good” (7). Both are denationalizing, and neither has aims to remedy this (Barber 7). The West and Islam are not so different if each creates generalizing and sometimes deleterious bonds in its own manner, undermining democracy as we know it. Islam, then, is not a threat to democracy; both the West and Islam are threats to democracy.
It is easy to fall into the trap of believing Islam and the West are headed towards an inevitable cultural collision of epic proportions, but I believe that the truth is much more complicated than that simple, diametric opposition that Lewis and Huntington allege. While it is true that Islam rejects much of Western culture, this is not because of cultural difference so much as Islam’s “rabid response to colonialism and imperialism and their economic children, capitalism and modernity” – throwing the baby out with the bathwater, if you will (Barber 11). The roots of Muslim rage run much shallower than Lewis and Huntington impressed upon us; there are no simplistic and intrinsic hatreds and differences. Instead, there is a history of colonialism continuing into present imperialism, and there is a hegemonic belief that the Western way is the right way. There is a complex relationship between the West and Islam, one that Mamdani and Pasquinelli describe, that causes both to impinge upon and react to one another, tying and twisting one another’s truths and ways.