I’ve discovered a blog written by members of the Baghdad Bureau of the New York Times. Its probably old news, but I just came across it for the first time this week. Some of the reporters are Iraqi and some are on assignment from the United States. The entries encompass everything from political cartoons, to photo-documentaries of events, to political, social and finical analyses of the current situation in Iraq. While looking through the recent posts on the blog, I came across an entry comparing Britain’s imperial history in Iraq (between 1922-1948) and the current American occupation of the country. The entry is written in response to the vote in Iraq’s parliament (on Monday, November 20, 2008, finalized today) on the proposed Security Agreement between Iraq and America The author chose to make the comparison by looking at headlines of the New York Times at key moments in Iraqi history to show the viewer that there are striking similarities to the headlines we are seeing today.
The comparison is not lost on the Iraqi government, because they are looking back to ensure that the past will not be replicated with the new Security Agreement. In another post about the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), an Iraqi journalist discussed the nature of politics in Iraq, in regard to the relationship between politics and religious beliefs. He commented on how interesting it is to see the impact that Ayatollah Sistani has had on the agreements. Every time there was a disagreement over the clauses of the agreement Shiite members of parliament came to Sistani and each time he told them to go back and keep negotiating, that an answer would present itself. The reporter, Al-Salhy, believes that it is Sistani’s wish to keep the debate over the SOFA in the parliament and out of the streets, because if we see that transition the country “will lose more blood [because] Each leader on the Sunni and Shiite side will ask his followers to fight the other” (Al-Salhy). This take on the process of the agreement is interesting, and suggests the possibility of a new way of dealing with the hybrid of religion and politics by Iraqis in power, such as Ayatollah Sistani. His need to keep the arguments trapped in the political realm rather than transferring the tensions to civilians is a change from how the agreements with the British were dealt with in the 1930s and 40s. There were riots in the city protesting the contracts being drawn up, resulting in civilian casualties and also the deaths of foreign attachés. This is something that both sides want to avoid, although in the situation of an occupied country negotiating its freedoms, violence will always play a part in the process.
The first article (comparing the headlines) discussed the forced resignation of the Shiite Prime Minister in 1948. Currently, I’m sure that the significance of this history is not lost on al-Maliki. The possibility of an uprising is not out of the question, and both US and Iraqi forces are very aware of this risk. I hadn’t really looked into the British-Iraqi agreements until reading this article, but it is something that I am going to continue to investigate as I continue to read and learn about happenings in Iraq. This urge to keep the review and approval (or disapproval) of the agreement in the government may have ulterior motives, especially to help those who are currently in power stay in power. So far it has been beneficial because they have come to an agreement to allow US Forces to stay in the country until 2011--pending a vote mid-2009 over several of the clauses in the agreement--without rioting or violence. Maliki gave a televised address today when Iraqi lawmakers approved the SOFA, so we have yet to see the aftermath of the civilian response (if any).
http://baghdadbureau.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/analysis-sofa-the-view-from-parliament/
by Suadad al-Salhy
http://baghdadbureau.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/20/security-agreement-deja-vu/
by Stephen Farrell