Islam, Media and the West: Fall '08

I noticed three major trends within our blogs:

1) Embarrassment about what we didn’t know before starting this class
2) Reactions to news articles- the hunt for those stories that defy or confirm the clash
3) A need to “un-learn” previous stereotypes and assumptions

1) I think that we all need to know that it is ok that we began this course in one place (with certain knowledge, assumptions etc) and that we have ended it in another- that is the point of education. One of my first blog posts is about the need for better education in both the East and the West about each region’s cultural history. I took three years of “World Civilizations” in high school, and we didn’t once speak about the Arab peninsula, the Bedouins, Persia, British imperialism in the ME, and somehow we discussed the Crusades without going into depth about Islam- looking back, that seems impossible but it is true. So really, can we blame ourselves for not knowing if no one exposed us to this knowledge in the first place? You can make the argument that ignorance is no excuse, but to me that has become an incredibly ‘clashist’ remark. We must acknowledge that much of the West is ignorant or, if not, then highly biased when you delve into a discussion of politics, history and culture of the East, and the same can probably be true in the East. So education, like media, needs to be reexamined to see whose voices are being left out of the history narrative- especially in the US (and I say especially because that is where our experiences with education have primarily taken place). I think the class, as a whole, would agree that elementary/upper school social studies education in the US needs to reevaluate what is being focused on in so-called “world history” courses (that turn out to have an overtly Western focus).

2) Everyone wrote about at least one news article in the course of the blog. What I thought was interesting is that we all took the approach of classifying each story, marking whether or not the article was perpetuating the clash, if it was orientalist, etc. Prof. Moran likes to call this “the curse of the media student”- the idea that we can’t see, listen to or read something without analyzing it. This has become true for many of us in this course- I know I can’t listen to someone speak about the Middle East without thinking to myself, now how much does s/he really know about this topic? Are they well-versed in the history of the region? Of the religious values and conflicts? Is what they are saying in line with Lewis, Said, or something else entirely? We all seemed to ask the same questions, and many people did comparisons of Al Jazeera coverage to the NYT, CNN, MSNBC etc. Generally, the consensus was that Al Jazeera was more objective, faster to report, and just overall different from the style we’re used to seeing in the papers and on TV here in the US. The election was a common theme in our blogs as well- our class is (not?) surprisingly liberal, and overwhelmingly knocked McCain for his many, many ...unfortunate statements about Arabs, OBL, and Obama. We jumped on the quotes for playing into the clash theory- and in this case, I don’t think this analysis is a bad thing. If we do not consider the clash argument, we may let problematic statements and media go unnoticed and unaddressed, but if we align everything with the clash theory, we will become cynics (Both El-Rassi and Said comment on this paradox). I’m hoping to eventually end up somewhere in-between, and I think that our blogs show that although there are days when we all felt overwhelmed, we still see a chance to get out the clash mentality and find ways to improve upon the dialogue between the East and the West.

3) Lauren mentioned this in two of her papers, I talked about it in one, and I saw evidence of this in several blogs as people reassessed different media that they had once “innocently” watched/read (and usually enjoyed) and now when they re-visit these past experiences, they find themselves problematizing everything from the Lion King to the New York Times. Rather than a “need to un-learn” we should think of it as a need to learn more. If Aladdin was your favorite Disney movie as a child and now you recognize the crazy stereotypes in it- don’t forsake that. Learn from it, and see where it takes you. Each experience we have builds upon others and we begin to formulate a new way of looking at the world. That is the point of our education, and to me, it is an essential part of life. So its ok that you learned something a certain way first, just be open to seeing that original knowledge evolve and change—this is the ultimate way to combat the clashist and orientalist ideas that we have all picked on in our entries.

ABSTRACT

The impression of Arab television that many Americans have garnered from US media coverage and a lack of true, investigatory knowledge is one that makes many assumptions, most of which are not true. The idea that all Arab media, especially the news programs are “anti-Western / anti-American ‘propaganda’” is one that will be challenged in this report. If media is a reflection of culture, then Arab television will certainly be different from Western television, because there is no mistaking that there are distinct differences between the societies of the East and the West. However, in this increasingly globalized world in which we live, there is also no denying that we exist only as separate communities or civilizations. Western media has laid down a format that the Arab society has followed, but they have also altered the foundation and made it their own.

The Structure of the Pan-Arab Television Industry

Americans assume that most Arab media is state or government run. We assume that Arabs have little or no freedom of the press to report on or run stories that are critical of the country in which the station is located. It is also commonly believed that if a television network is government funded, then the government exercises control over the content produced and enforces a bias in favor of state policies, decisions and political figures. Rather enjoying than the “freedom” that the media experiences in Western nations, Arab media is assumed to be nothing more than a hegemonic device for the state. Although it is true that several Arab governments play a more active role in the production of media than in the West, it is not the norm.

Ways of Describing Middle Eastern Broadcast Media
• The structure of Arab television can be looked at as pre and post 1990. Before 1990, there were three structural formats that the media followed.
o Countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Iran and more were strict governmental control.
o Morocco, Tunisa, Qatar and others followed the loyalist system—their stations were not owned by the government but they clearly “toed the party lines” (Tawil-Souri 11/3/08).
o Only Lebanon and Israel maintained the separation of media and state and “were free” (Tawil-Souri 11/3/08).
• This way of structuring media is modeled after the Western idea of the public service model of broadcasting, where the government funds all efforts and the business is not advertising driven, unlike the commercial model of the US.
• The public service model is used to educate the masses rather than to inspire a consumerist culture. With the aid of government funding, the elites of the government can choose what information will be disseminated through the broadcasts.
• As the Gulf War progressed, people had to turn to CNN and other Western television to stay updated on the happenings of the war. Through this the Middle Eastern viewers realized that they needed to have media that showcased their point of view (Tawil-Souri 11/3/08). After 1990 things began to change drastically as “Arab television...witnessed a revolution led by Gulf and Lebanese satellite television” (Hammond 209). The emergence of this new technology lead to a “transnational explosion” of new media, beginning with the Saudi launch of MBC, a network with “production values and journalistic standards that match those of the rest of the world” (Hammond 209). MBC was first, followed by Dubai TV, Saudi owned ART and Orbit, and later Lebanon’s LBC and Qatar’s Al-Jazeera arrived to further challenge traditional structures of Arab television. Egypt too pushed the mold by opening their media to commercialization, departing from the old public service model and moving toward a more capitalist, Western way of functioning (Tawil-Souri 11/3/08).
• Post 1990 there are new ways of categorizing Arab television.
o Nationalized television functions much like the strict control model. Syria, Sudan, Libya and Iran still fall into this category.
o Loyalist structured media remains the same, with networks that are not governmentally funded but still are very aware of the way they portray the state in the content produced. Most of the Gulf countries fall into this category (Tawil-Souri 11/3/08).
o Diverse structures have minimal government involvement; countries such as Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco and Yemen can be looked at in this manner.
o Transitional television media can be looked at as in-between the older structures and the free western model. Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, post-2003 Iraq are all in the process of developing new models for the television industry within their countries (Tawil-Souri, Arab).
• American assumptions about the business and structures of pan-Arab television can be reexamined in light of the clear development of the new diverse and evolving media landscape.

Programming Trends in the Emerging Pan-Arab
Television Landscape

It is evident that structure of the media business in the Middle East is not always what it is supposed to be, so it should not be a surprise that the content of programming on these networks challenges many preconceived notions as well. Rather than conservative, state-favored/controlled programming, the content seen on most Arab stations has evolved right along with the changing structure of the television industry. Although there are still networks and channels that are state-controlled, they are far from being the majority as one flips through the more than 350 free channels available transnationally (Tawil-Souri 11/3/08). There is a trend of increasingly liberal programming and a departure from what once might have been considered the norm. Politics and social opinions find their way into the programming, much like in the US, creating some of the stigma associated with Arab television in the West. Middle Eastern media is a reflection of its society, and this can be seen in the diversity of the content aired.

What’s on Television?
• For Westerners, the most infamous news program in the Middle East is Al Jazeera, a Qatar based network that prides itself on having the only independent and completely objective news programming in the Middle East. Lebanese owned LBC too has pushed to break the mold of traditional Middle Eastern broadcasting.
o Though the news in Lebanon and Qatar is still not entirely free, both networks remain loyal to their respective governments and the politics of the country. Nabil Dajani, a communications professor at the American University of Beirut, comments on this sectarian approach, “You can't only blame the media – who is behind the media? Politicians. And it's the government's fault for allowing the media to get away with it” (Cochrane).
o When examining the “objectivity” of a news source in the Middle East, we must consider the influence of the government on the content produced. That said, as a country that supports the freedom of the press, America has no right to bar Al Jazeera or any other Eastern news source simply because they broadcast messages and images that we do not want to see or hear.
• News programming is the most controversial and debated subject of Arab television by far, so much that other outlets of expression are overlooked when assessing the industry as a whole. Another common misconception of the Middle East in general is that women have no public or critical voice in their society. Women are now finding a voice in satellite television programming, which provides them with a place to debate and speak about issues that are concerning their societies.
o Kalam Nawaem or "Sweet Talk" is a talk show that is similar to ABC’s The View: four women from different backgrounds gather together to speak about what is currently being celebrated, debated or disliked by the Arab world. Their diversity is a reflection of the diversity of the region, and can be seen in the content produced. “By design, the show does not relay one message. The four hosts vary in age, nationality, [religious beliefs] and background so they bring different points of view to provoke thought and debate...and are pushing social boundaries carefully...a key to the show’s appeal” (van der Haak).
• Reality television is another type of television media that has been hugely popular in the Arab world, much like in the US. There are many formats for reality programming in the Middle East, but the ones that have garnered the most attention are the American Idol style talent competition shows.
o Star Academy “is one of the most-watched programs in Arab television history” but is also considered to be controversial because of its Western format and tendency to push at traditional social norms in the area (Algeria). However, when Algerian officials thought that Star Academy had gone too far, they created a show that responded to the Islamic roots of the society entitled The Knights of the Quran. Contestants compete to be named “the world's top Quran reciter” (Algeria).
o This alternative programming can be looked at as part of a rising effort to “seek to preserve cultural and Islamic identity” within the expansion of growth and change of technology and programming trends.
• Though much of the evolution of Arab television can be traced back to Western formats, it is clear that Middle Easterners are actively seeking to ensure that their culture and heritage do not get lost in what is often considered to be a Western medium. The goal of Arab television programming is caught somewhere between modernizing a predominately Islamic society and Islamizing (or influencing) the rapid growth of modern society.

US Involvement in Arab Television:
Analysis and Recommendation for the Future

I remain very firm in my opinion that Arab television is shaped by the culture and history of the region. I also believe the same is true of television in West, especially in the United States. The US has tried to launch a television station to act as its “mouth piece” and as a “counter to Al Jazeera” in the world of Middle Eastern news. However, the channel has been relatively unsuccessful: “Eventually, you will find Al Hurra in eleventh place [amongst other networks] with 14 percent viewership” (Snyder). Though Al Hurra is only one example of US involvement in Arab television, it is a perfect case study. The network has made some unfortunate programming mistakes, one of the most notable being when it aired “a documentary on the “The Crusades... Muslim staffers saw the program as an unfortunate reprise of Bush’s 2001 comment that the coming ‘war on terrorism,’ would be a ‘crusade’” (Linzer).

• I am not recommending that the US withdraw from broadcasting in the Middle East. I am recommending that the US continue broadcasting in the East, but with a new approach to content that mirrors the current trends occurring in Arab television programming today.
• I am also recommending that we allow networks such as Al Jazeera, LBC, and others to be broadcasted in the US, allowing Americans to watch the programming choices made by these networks and to make their own decisions about the content aired.
• By withdrawing the Western media from the East, we would confirm the ‘clash’ theory because that action would say that there is no place for a Western voice in the East. In turn, by denying Middle Eastern channels the chance to broadcast in the West we are saying there is no place for an Eastern voice in the West. “Products like Coca-Cola are far more effectively branded around the globe than the United States itself... The American entertainment and communications industry has the technological and creative expertise to improve relations between our country and the rest of the world” (Bryce Zabel in Arango).
• In order to stop perpetuating the theory of ‘the clash of civiliaztions’ we must allow Middle Eastern networks to be broadcasted in the United States, and we must still maintain a US channel in the East. If we do not adopt this policy, the United State’s reputation abroad will continue to suffer with the label of being an imperialist nation.

Works Cited

"Algeria launches Islamic version of Star Academy." Al Arabiya News Channel. 29 July 2007. 7 Dec. 2008 .

Arango, Tim. "World Falls for American Media, Even as It Sours on America." The New York Times Online. 30 Nov. 2008. 6 Dec. 2008 .

Cochrane, Paul. "Are Lebanon’s Media fanning the flames of sectarianism?" Arab Media and Society. May 2007. 5 Dec. 2008 .

Dishing Democarcy. Dir. Bregtje Van der Haak.

Hammond, Andrew. Popular Culture in the Arab World. 204-18.

Linzer, Dafna. "Lost in Translation: Alhurra—America’s Troubled Effort to Win Middle East Hearts and Minds." ProPublica. 22 June 2008. 7 Dec. 2008 .

Snyder, Alvin. "Viewpoint: Al Hurra struggling for ratings." Middle Eastern Times. 25 Nov. 2005. 5 Dec. 2008 .

Tawil-Souri, Helga. "Arab Television in Academic Scholarship." Wiley Interscience. 20 Aug. 2008. 5 Dec. 2008 .

Tawil-Souri, Helga. "Arab Television." Lecture. New York University. 3 Nov. 2008.

"India's inability to modernize its 150-million strong Muslim population, the second largest after Indonesia's, has spawned a community that is ill-equipped to seize new economic opportunities and susceptible to militant Islam's faith-based appeal."
-Sadanand Dhume, Wall Street Journal 11/28/08

This article caught my attention because it was the only one (in a long list of coverage) that discussed the fault of the terrorist attacks as partially India's burden. I've poked around on a few sites to find out what this writers background is, and why he is so harsh in his article, "India's Antiterror Blunders." I have watched some interviews with him and read about his book, My Friend the Fanatic, which is the story of traveling with an Indonesian fundamentalist. In interviews he repeatedly states that he believes that the threat of terrorism is not as eminent as it once was in the West, due to increased intelligence and a smarter, more aware defense force. He sees the East, with more of a focus on Indonesia, India and Pakistan than on the areas this class has focused on, as the new battle grounds of terrorist militant groups.

Dhume is quick to denounce the India government and their weak antiterror defense system. I am not well versed in Indian foreign or internal policies, but I do think there is something inherently problematic with his accusation, that 'modernizing' the Muslim population should not have crept into his argument. He casually throws around the term, as if it is a weakness that the population is "not modern." His writing style is guilty of Orientalism, as he uses knowledge and power to indicate that he knows better than those immediately involved. His view of modernity is interlinked with Orientalism. He sees modernism as a way of thwarting fundamentalism and Islamist groups, but only if Muslims come to modernity, not if modernity comes to them. And, for that matter, that they will be "susceptible to militant Islam's...appeal" because they are not modernized. His statements are bold and Said would say that he needs to use a humanistic lens to examine the problems in India before making such generalizations about the Muslim population of the country as a whole- and I'd agree- this type of writing in mainstream media outlets such as the WSJ only serves to further the idea of a 'clash' in the minds of people who do not actively seek to deconstruct the theory.

Also, I am addicted to following the story as it unfolds in India because my uncle was supposed to be staying in the Taj Mahal hotel starting tomorrow while on a business trip- which has now been cancelled but I'm still a little freaked out. Of course, the terrorist attacks have immediately been compared to the "work" of al-Qaeda. Almost every news report I have read or seen has discussed the similarities between Deccan Mujahideen and al-Qaeda, and then follows up with the fact that so far there is not any established connection between the two groups (at least for this incident). It is ridiculous that the media are pulling in this non-connection just to put things into context for the viewers. There are rumors that the Deccan Mujahideen are based out of Pakistan, and that this will be detrimental to the discussion of reconciliation of the two countries that was slowly beginning with the push from president-elect Obama's foreign policy plan. There is also discussion that the attacks are in response to Hindi-Muslim relations in the country, though news reports are saying that many of the victims are actually tourists, especially Americans and Brits. Also, one of the attacks was on a Jewish center in Mumbai, so who knows in the midst of all this chaos if any of this will prove to be true. I'm going to bed, more to follow when there is new information that is not a jumbled mess of speculation.

I’ve discovered a blog written by members of the Baghdad Bureau of the New York Times. Its probably old news, but I just came across it for the first time this week. Some of the reporters are Iraqi and some are on assignment from the United States. The entries encompass everything from political cartoons, to photo-documentaries of events, to political, social and finical analyses of the current situation in Iraq. While looking through the recent posts on the blog, I came across an entry comparing Britain’s imperial history in Iraq (between 1922-1948) and the current American occupation of the country. The entry is written in response to the vote in Iraq’s parliament (on Monday, November 20, 2008, finalized today) on the proposed Security Agreement between Iraq and America The author chose to make the comparison by looking at headlines of the New York Times at key moments in Iraqi history to show the viewer that there are striking similarities to the headlines we are seeing today.

The comparison is not lost on the Iraqi government, because they are looking back to ensure that the past will not be replicated with the new Security Agreement. In another post about the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), an Iraqi journalist discussed the nature of politics in Iraq, in regard to the relationship between politics and religious beliefs. He commented on how interesting it is to see the impact that Ayatollah Sistani has had on the agreements. Every time there was a disagreement over the clauses of the agreement Shiite members of parliament came to Sistani and each time he told them to go back and keep negotiating, that an answer would present itself. The reporter, Al-Salhy, believes that it is Sistani’s wish to keep the debate over the SOFA in the parliament and out of the streets, because if we see that transition the country “will lose more blood [because] Each leader on the Sunni and Shiite side will ask his followers to fight the other” (Al-Salhy). This take on the process of the agreement is interesting, and suggests the possibility of a new way of dealing with the hybrid of religion and politics by Iraqis in power, such as Ayatollah Sistani. His need to keep the arguments trapped in the political realm rather than transferring the tensions to civilians is a change from how the agreements with the British were dealt with in the 1930s and 40s. There were riots in the city protesting the contracts being drawn up, resulting in civilian casualties and also the deaths of foreign attachés. This is something that both sides want to avoid, although in the situation of an occupied country negotiating its freedoms, violence will always play a part in the process.

The first article (comparing the headlines) discussed the forced resignation of the Shiite Prime Minister in 1948. Currently, I’m sure that the significance of this history is not lost on al-Maliki. The possibility of an uprising is not out of the question, and both US and Iraqi forces are very aware of this risk. I hadn’t really looked into the British-Iraqi agreements until reading this article, but it is something that I am going to continue to investigate as I continue to read and learn about happenings in Iraq. This urge to keep the review and approval (or disapproval) of the agreement in the government may have ulterior motives, especially to help those who are currently in power stay in power. So far it has been beneficial because they have come to an agreement to allow US Forces to stay in the country until 2011--pending a vote mid-2009 over several of the clauses in the agreement--without rioting or violence. Maliki gave a televised address today when Iraqi lawmakers approved the SOFA, so we have yet to see the aftermath of the civilian response (if any).

http://baghdadbureau.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/analysis-sofa-the-view-from-parliament/
by Suadad al-Salhy

http://baghdadbureau.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/20/security-agreement-deja-vu/
by Stephen Farrell

Ayman al-Zawahiri recently released a tape denouncing the election of Barack Obama to the office of the presidency. In the process he called him some pretty terrible names and compared him “unfavorably to the late Malcolm X” (CNN). Most of the articles I’ve read about this have all suggested that Al Qaeda’s position on the election is contradictory—the “tactics favored by George W. Bush, including his ill-fated invasion of Iraq, were a gift to al-Qaeda and its recruiting efforts. They allowed bin Laden and Zawahiri to paint the U.S. government as an imperial power bent on a 21st-century crusade against Islam. However, that’s a more difficult argument to make when the Oval Office is occupied by a black man whose Kenyan grandfather was Muslim and who played with Muslim friends during his childhood years in Indonesia” (Tucker). For me, the issue (or non-issue) of Obama’s religious belief was one of the most interesting of the campaign. The media often aired/published stories where his name was linked to Islam, but only ones that carried a negative message. It was implied that if any evidence of devotion or practice of Islam in President-elect Obama’s life surfaced, the election would have had a very different outcome. The thing I find the most frustrating about the stigma that this places on Islam is that there aren’t more people out there challenging the fact that these rumors could have such an impact on American political views.

When Obama delivered his speech, “A More Perfect Union,” he left one question unasked that many of us are waiting to hear. He discussed the concerns that the American public voice about his views on religion, freedom, race and patriotism, but did not address one the controversial rumor that Senator Obama is actually a Muslim and will “hand the keys of the West Wing to bin Laden” as soon as he is elected (Tucker). If there is actually a strong base of people who truly believe that a Muslim leader would destroy the democratic, supposedly secular values of the country, what does that say about our belief system as a country? That freedom of speech or freedom of religion is fine as long as it is not affecting me directly? It is perhaps a tribute to the current state of modernization as we know it that Obama was unable to pose the question that is on the tip of my tongue whenever these discussions come up, “Even if I was a practicing Muslim, why should that matter?” Although I know that others have spoken out (most notably Colin Powell) about this issue- but it needs to come from Obama himself if we really want to bring notice and discussion to this very skewed assumption that being Arab or Muslim does not fit in with the American dream, or with American values.

All this back-and-forth about his religious beliefs then leads us to the larger question at hand—If this election was the first step toward a new generation of equality and tolerance in the United States, how do we reconcile this new internal image with the much uglier one that we have acquired abroad thanks to recent foreign affairs policies? The idea of Change has been a key message for Obama, and I like to believe that we will see change. Not just within our own country, but in how our country interacts with the rest of the world. If the election of a black US president signifies the beginning of the end of white male supremacy as a social norm, then the theory that the US is run by a bunch of privileged, imperialistic white men falls short as Obama comes into power. Will this have an impact on how the greater Muslim community views our country and our politics? Its too soon to tell, but I think that we sent a message to the world (not just to the East, but to the rest of the Western nations as well) that we are trying to move in a new direction. Again, I’m sounding idealistic, but this is just one possibility in many as to how things will turn out as this all unravels.

by Cynthia Tucker
http://www.ajc.com/services/content/opinion/stories/2008/11/23/tucked.html

From CNN
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/11/21/obama.muslim.remark/?imw=Y&iref=mpstoryemail#cnnSTCVideo

http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/music/2008/11/21/2008-11-21_call_him_mikaeel_michael_jackson_reporte.html

So Michael "Mikaeel" Jackson has converted to Islam, says the Daily News and a few other sources. What is interesting about the swarm of tabloid gossip that has emerged out of this is that no one is asking "why Islam"... they're just enjoying the oddity of Jackson's private life and looking at the story as pure entertainment. Although I did see another article claiming "Al Qaida would support his decision," bring in an element of politics that is almost unnecessary in a piece like this. It was Jackson's own choice to convert, and we should not be looking to any organization or individual to authenticate his decision- the media continuously drag negative buzz words and images into stories about Islam when there is no reason to do so. We have been looking at the modernizing islam/islamizing modernity idea from the Eastern point of view- I think that this change needs to happen for both the East and the West. This new movement for change/growth, if sparked at the same time in both parts of the world could enable a new outlet for a progressive dialogue about the conflicts that exist today. Yes, I am often idealistic, but that is because if I am not I will get lost in the anger and negativity that is imbedded in the exploration of these conflicts. We call it a culture war for a reason--there are casualties, not only of people but of logical reasoning--perhaps this loss of logical reasoning is the reason that we have war in the first place. But that begs the question, did we lost the ability to communicate without violence somewhere along the way, or did we ever have it to begin with?

What can be problematic with how we study media?

The study of media representations often gets buried in an onslaught of negativity. We, as media scholars, say that stereotypes are harmful. We warn of the dangers of media effects, censorship and propaganda, and though we recognize that audiences are often better critical thinkers than we originally thought, much of the discussion about media is critical and negative. We problematize media and don’t spend enough time highlighting its benefits and celebrating its successes. This is a direct reflection of how we, as members of a larger society, define ourselves. Our quest eternal quest to know our own identities is almost always determined by stating what we are not, will not and cannot be. We create the idea of the “other” to juxtapose with our own identities, and then we are trapped into the interminable process of comparing and contrasting the two and looking for differences.

What is problematic about the clash argument and Orientalism?

This course has exposed us to many ways of thinking about the other, in this case specifically what Said coins the “Orient” and the “Orientals” who reside there. The clash argument and Orientalism have overwhelmed my thoughts to the point where I feel like there is nothing left to do but reject them both and start again. Believing in these theories does not allow for growth or change and leads to a continual standstill of thought, and are always accompanied by a pessimistic outlook for the future. The only aspect of these theories that I can continue to use as a way of looking at media is the idea of a humanistic approach. It is the only lens that we have studied that doesn’t ask us to see disparities, but instead forces us to try and see people as people, and not as representations, Orientals or others. The humanistic perspective reminds us that we are, in fact, all human, with similar needs, wants and goals.

How can we find new ways of looking media that falls under the ‘jurisdiction’ of the clash argument?

Rather than asking how something perpetuates the clash, or if it is Orientalist, we should try to see how a particular text deconstructs the validity of these arguments. Instead of seeking out portrayals of the East or of the West, we should look for portrayals of humanity and how these representations can be seen as universal, which will help to leave clashist theory behind.

This is a Q&A with myself, to be supplemented by the above blog entry as an introduction...

Why does this group of authors choose to express themselves through non-traditional outlets?

These authors write about a part of the world that is often underrepresented in traditional media outlets (television, film, radio, novels etc). They all focus on subject matter that is not typically discussed critically or fairly by mainstream media, so they have found other ways of telling their stories. All but Salam Pax have chosen to translate their tales into art. Though Pax’s blogs are not accompanied by pictures or prose, it can be argued that his journal-entry style writing offers a touch of compassion and humanity not often gleaned from other styles of writing. Art is a universal form of expression, and it enables cross-cultural communication in a way that no other medium can. When reading between the lines and frames in these texts, you can see the frustrations of a people who have not, and are not, being heard.

The graphic novel is a non-traditional form of media- is this distinction important to make? Does the comic affect the reader differently?

The graphic novel is a unique medium. It is a longer version of the comic, centered around a complex plotline that, unlike an ongoing comic series, has a beginning, middle and end. Graphic novels are often composed for a more mature audience and address subject matter that a comic cannot due to its shorter format. Comics are considered to be a light media with little consequence. They are often fantastical, so when topics like the Iran-Iraq war or the Palestine-Israel conflict are portrayed in panels of art these controversial issues are discussed in new ways. The comic format almost tricks the reader into thinking that the messages of the text will be lighter and easier to digest than other forms of media. The graphic novel seems innocuous at first but as Said notes in his introduction to Joe Sacco’s Palestine,

Comics provide...a directness of approach (the attractively and literally overstated combination of pictures and words) that [seem] unassailably true, on the one hand, and marvelously close, impinging familiar on the other...in ways that I still find fascinating to decode, comics in their relentless foregrounding—far more than say, film cartoons or funnies...—seemed to say what couldn’t be otherwise said, perhaps what wasn’t permitted to be said or imagined, defying the ordinary processes of thought, which are policed, shaped, and re-shaped by all sorts of pedagogical as well as ideological pressures. (Sacco vi)

This medium is the bridge between written and visual culture and the resulting hybrid is a medium that has a potent potential to reach new audiences. People who were once afraid or intimidated by the “hard” issues can engage with these humanistic portrayals, providing the reader with a history while contextualizing the narratives on a personal level.

How can we better understand the cultures of Iran, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and Islam through these particular mediums, from these specific stories?

We must acknowledge that each of the stories being told are from individuals, and what one person says or thinks cannot stand for a whole nation, or culture. But, at the same time, they are each a form of human expression and therefore there is a universal quality that allows the reader to have a very basic understanding of the religious, historical and cultural influences that shape each narrative. Marjane Satrapi and Mazen Kerbaj’s accounts are rooted in growing up during wartime, however, each author chooses to represent his/her childhood self differently. Through personal narratives, these stories shed new light on topics that are often buried by other media. In class we had an animated discussion about how these authors cannot be considered as representations of cultural norms. There is truth to this statement, and just because we know Marjane Satrapi’s story doesn’t mean that we can suddenly understand the Iranian people. What we didn’t address in class is that these stories sever as excellent introductions to a culture that few Westerners have ever really interacted with. Yes, Satrapi is unique in her way of thinking, but she offers a view of Iran rarely seen in any other medium. She gives a face and a familiarity to many foreign concepts, everything from growing up during a war to the veil and what it means to different women.

Joe Sacco stands out in this grouping of authors because he is a westerner writing about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Sacco is very honest in his approach and he is clearly looking for personal accounts of Palestinians who have suffered. He tries to humanize a people who have been abstracted into terrorists who see no solution other than violence by mainstream media. The most striking moment in the book, for me, is when a woman Sacco is interviewing, “wants to know how talking to [Sacco] is going to help her. We don’t want money, she says, we want our land, our humanity. Aren’t we people too?” (Sacco 242/3-4). Though he can’t articulate it at that exact moment in his book, this is precisely why Sacco chose to write Palestine. He is using a non-traditional form of media to provide a dissenting opinion of the Paliestine-Israel conflict as it is portrayed in conventional media. Though we cannot come away from his writing and say, yes, this is who the Palestinian people are, Sacco, like Satrapi, offers us an introduction into explosive foreign territory.

Though Salam Pax and Mahmoud Darwish do not use pictures, their accounts of Iraq and Lebanon are no less graphic than the others’. Pax is the most casual of our authors, and because of this tone his account is perhaps the easiest to read and to connect with. He quickly shatters any stereotype we might have imposed upon him with his witty banter and continual mentions of western pop culture. Pax shows us the view from the other side of a war that America is fighting, and serves as a reminder that the victims of this war are not just Saddam supporters or terrorists, but people who do not want to lose their homes and family to destruction. When discussing his own fears about the war, Pax states, “I worry about what will happen during the attacks and I worry more about what will happen afterward. I take walks in parts of the old city and I can’t stop thinking, ‘Will this still be here this time next year?’” (Pax 38) He brings the foreign territory of war to a familiar place for those who have not experienced this kind of threat before. Darwish uses language to establish an emotional bond with the reader. His messages are coded in prose, but they are still clear: war disrupts a person’s daily routine, and denies him of rights he once thought were basic. His account is the most abstract, but the universal act of drinking a morning coffee makes his story relatable. Pax and Darwish both tell a side of history that is often overlooked. While we cannot extrapolate a complete larger understanding of society from their accounts, they offer a stepping-stone between two distanced cultures.

The 99 are different from the other texts because the characters are representatives of Islam from around the world, not just from one country or one perspective. The comic uses religion as a link to bring together people of different ages, ethnicities, genders and strengths to work together fighting for world peace. The 99 offers a secular view of Islam and portrays the religion in a positive light. The comics deconstruct negative stereotypes and present a view of Islam not often seen. It is the only text from which we can deduce a larger understanding of Islam because The 99 is rooted in Islamic values. However, each of these texts provide introductions to cultures that are not usually seen or heard in the media. These texts turn to alternative outlets to bring humanistic familiarity to otherwise abstract concepts, and, in the process, pave the way for new dialogues between Islam and the West.

Works Cited

Sacco, Joe. Palestine: The Special Edition. Fantagraphics, 2007.

Satrapi, Marjane. Persepolis 1: The Story of a Childhood. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004.

Satrapi, Marjane. Persepolis 2: The Story of a Return. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004.

Mahmoud Darwish, Memory for Forgetfulness: August, Beirut, 1982: pp.1-28.

Salam Pax. The Clandestine Diary of an Ordinary Iraqi. New York: Grove Press, 2003.

Al-Mutawa, Naif and Fabian Nicieza. The 99 #0-7. Tashkeel Comics, 2007.

Kerbaj, Mazen. A Happy Childhood. Words Without Borders, 2008.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5019779.ece

An article about the US lead raid in Syria today. It has an interesting summation of the relationship between the three countries, to build on our discussion of it.